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Descriptions	  which	  have	  grown	  capital	  letters 	  	  BRIAN	  RABERN	  
	  [Version	  22.02.14.	  Final	  version	  forthcoming	  in	  Mind	  &	  Language]	  	  
Abstract:	   	   	  Almost	   entirely	   ignored	   in	   the	   linguistic	   theorising	  on	  names	  and	  descriptions	   is	   a	  
hybrid	  form	  of	  expression	  which,	  like	  definite	  descriptions,	  begin	  with	  ‘the’	  but	  which,	  like	  proper	  names,	  are	  capitalised	  and	  seem	  to	   lack	  descriptive	  content.	  These	  are	  expressions	  such	  as	   the	  following,	  ‘the	  Holy	  Roman	  Empire’,	  ‘the	  Mississippi	  River’,	  or	  ‘the	  Space	  Needle’.	  Such	  capitalised	  
descriptions	  are	  ubiquitous	  in	  natural	  language,	  but	  to	  which	  linguistic	  categories	  do	  they	  belong?	  Are	   they	   simply	  proper	  names?	  Or	  are	   they	  definite	  descriptions	  with	  unique	  orthography?	  Or	  are	   they	   something	   else	   entirely?	   This	   paper	   assesses	   two	   obvious	   assimilation	   strategies:	   (i)	  assimilation	  to	  proper	  names	  and	  (ii)	  assimilation	  to	  definite	  descriptions.	  It	  is	  argued	  that	  both	  of	   these	   strategies	   face	   major	   difficulties.	   The	   primary	   goal	   is	   to	   lay	   the	   groundwork	   for	   a	  linguistic	   analysis	   of	   capitalised	   descriptions.	   Yet,	   the	   hope	   is	   that	   clearing	   the	   ground	   on	  capitalised	  descriptions	  may	  reveal	  useful	   insights	  for	  the	  on-­‐going	  research	  into	  the	  semantics	  and	  syntax	  of	  their	  lower-­‐case	  or	  ‘the’-­‐less	  relatives.	  	   This	  agglomeration	  which	  was	  called	  and	  which	  still	  calls	  itself	  the	  Holy	  
	  Roman	  Empire	  was	  neither	  holy,	  nor	  Roman,	  nor	  an	  empire.	  	  [Voltaire	  1756,	  Essai	  sur	  les	  mœurs	  et	  l'esprit	  des	  nations]	  	  Research	   into	   the	   syntax	   and	   semantics	   of	   proper	   names	   and	   definite	  descriptions—and	  the	  linguistic	  relations	  between	  these	  types	  of	  expressions—has	   occupied	   much	   of	   the	   philosophy	   of	   language	   for	   at	   least	   a	   century.	   This	  literature	  has	  dealt	  with	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  questions,	  e.g.	  ‘How	  is	  the	  referent	  of	  a	  name	   or	   description	   determined?’,	   ‘What	   is	   the	   logical	   form	   of	   a	   name	   or	  	  description:	   are	   they	   referential	   devices,	   quantificational	   phrases,	   variables,	   or	  predicates?’,	  ‘What	  are	  the	  semantic	  contents	  of	  names	  and	  descriptions?’,	  ‘What	  do	  assertions	  involving	  names	  and	  descriptions	  communicate?’.	  Think	  of	  Frege’s	  ‘On	   sense	   and	   reference’	   (Frege	   1892),	   Russell’s	   ‘On	   denoting’	   (Russell	   1905),	  Kripke’s	  Naming	  and	  Necessity	  (Kripke	  1980)	  and	  all	  the	  literature	  generated	  by	  these	  works,	   e.g.	   Strawson	   (1950),	  Donnellan	   (1966),	  Montague	   (1973),	   Evans	  (1979),	  Heim	  (1982),	  to	  name	  but	  a	  few.	  This	  literature	  is	  extensive	  and	  rich,	  full	  of	   interesting	   examples,	   philosophical	   insights,	   and	   technical	   innovations.	   Yet,	  almost	   entirely	   ignored	   in	   this	   vast	   literature	   is	   an	   apparent	   hybrid	   form	   of	  expression	   which,	   like	   definite	   descriptions,	   begin	   with	   ‘the’	   but	   which,	   like	  proper	   names,	   are	   capitalised	   and	   seem	   to	   lack	   descriptive	   content.	   These	   are	  expressions	  such	  as	  the	  following:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 Over	   a	   period	   of	   a	   few	  months	   Ian	  Nance	   and	   I	   constantly	   discussed	   the	   issues	   raised	   in	   this	  paper	  and	  I	  owe	  many	  of	  the	  insights	  herein	  to	  those	  fruitful	  conversations.	  An	  early	  version	  of	  this	   paper	   was	   presented	   at	   the	   2012	   APA	   in	   Seattle,	   and	   the	   paper	   has	   benefited	   from	   the	  perceptive	  commentary	  by	  James	  Shaw	  (and	  a	  subsequent	  correspondence).	  The	  paper	  has	  also	  greatly	   benefited	   from	   a	   discussion	  with	   Anders	   Schoubye,	  which	   inspired	  me	   to	   return	   to	   an	  abandoned	   draft	   of	   this	   paper.	   Thanks	   also	   to	   Daniel	   Nolan,	   Philip	   Atkins,	   Bryan	   Pickel,	   Dan	  Korman,	  David	  Chalmers,	  Leon	  Leontyev,	  Paolo	  Santorio,	  Dilip	  Ninan,	  John	  Cusbert,	  and	  various	  anonymous	  referees	  for	  providing	  helpful	  comments	  on	  earlier	  drafts.	  	  
Address	   for	   correspondence:	   PPLS,	   University	   of	   Edinburgh,	   3	   Charles	   St.,	   Edinburgh,	   EH8	  9AD,	  United	  Kingdom	  
Email:	  brian.rabern@ed.ac.uk	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• the	  Holy	  Roman	  Empire	  	  
• the	  Round	  Table	  	  
• the	  Statue	  of	  Liberty	  	  
• the	  Great	  Emancipator	  	  
• the	  Grand	  Canyon	  
• the	  Salisbury	  Crags	  
• the	  Bronze	  Age	  	  
• the	  United	  Nations	  	  
• the	  Mississippi	  River	  
• the	  Outback	  
• the	  Man	  With	  No	  Name	  
• the	  Leaning	  Tower	  of	  Pisa	  
• the	  Oval	  Office	  	  
• the	  Golden	  Waterway	  	  
• the	  Angelic	  Doctor	  
• the	  Parthenon	  	  
• the	  Milky	  Way	  	  
• the	  Morning	  Star	  	  
• the	  Renaissance	  	  
• the	  South	  Pole	  	  
• the	  Bridge	  to	  Nowhere	  	  
• the	  Space	  Needle	  	  These	   expressions—call	   them	   descriptions	   which	   have	   grown	   capital	   letters	   or	  
capitalised	   descriptions,	   for	   short—are	   ubiquitous	   in	   natural	   language. 1	  Obviously,	   proper	   names	   and	   definite	   descriptions	   each	   have	   a	   close	   kinship	  with	  this	  hybrid	  form	  of	  expression.	  So	  much	  so,	  in	  fact,	  that	  we	  might	  expect	  a	  comprehensive	   linguistic	   analysis	   of	   names	   and	   descriptions	   to	   provide	   a	  linguistic	   analysis	   of	   capitalised	   descriptions.	   That	   is,	   we	   might	   demand	   an	  answer	  to	  the	  following	  questions:	  to	  which	  syntactic	  and	  semantic	  categories	  do	  capitalised	  descriptions	  belong?	  Are	  they	  simply	  proper	  names	  but	  with	  vestigial	  articles?	   Or	   are	   they	   genuine	   definite	   noun	   phrases	   but	   with	   unique	  orthography?	  Or	   are	   they	   something	   else	   entirely?	   	  My	   aim	   in	   this	   paper	   is	   to	  address	   this	   neglected	   set	   of	   questions.	   	   My	   primary	   goal	   is	   to	   lay	   the	  groundwork	  for	  a	   linguistic	  analysis	  of	  capitalised	  descriptions.	  Yet,	  my	  hope	  is	  that	   clearing	   the	   ground	  on	   capitalised	  descriptions	  may	   reveal	   useful	   insights	  for	   the	  on-­‐going	   research	   into	   the	   semantics	   and	   syntax	  of	   their	   lower-­‐case	  or	  ‘the’-­‐less	  relatives.	  After	   outlining	   some	   of	   the	   key	   orthographic,	   syntactic,	   and	   semantic	  features	   of	   capitalised	   descriptions,	   I	   will	   go	   on	   to	   assess	   the	   two	   obvious	  assimilation	  strategies:	  (i)	  assimilation	  to	  proper	  names	  and	  (ii)	  assimilation	  to	  definite	   descriptions.	   I	   will	   argue	   that	   both	   of	   these	   strategies	   face	   major	  difficulties.	   Syntactically,	   capitalised	   descriptions	   act	   like	   definite	   descriptions,	  and	  thus	  are	  not	  syntactically	  simple,	  as	  the	  assimilation	  to	  names	  would	  seem	  to	  require.	   But	   semantically,	   capitalised	   descriptions	   act	   in	   a	   certain	  manner	   like	  proper	  names,	  and	   thus	  are	  not	  semantically	  descriptive,	  as	   the	  assimilation	   to	  descriptions	  would	  seem	  to	  require.	  Finally,	  I'll	  consider	  a	  promising	  proposal	  to	  accommodate	  both	  the	  syntactic	  complexity	  and	  the	  seemingly	  non-­‐descriptional	  semantic	   behaviour	   of	   capitalised	   descriptions.	   This	   is	   the	   hypothesis	   that	   the	  capitalised	   nouns	   that	   constitute	   the	   restrictor	   are	   metalinguistic	   predicates.	  This	  final	  proposal	  dovetails	  nicely	  with	  the	  predicate	  view	  of	  proper	  names	  (e.g.	  Burge	  1973).	   But	   the	  proposal	   thereby	   also	   inherits	   some	  of	   the	  most	   difficult	  problems	  with	  the	  metalinguistic	  analysis	  of	  names.	  	  In	  the	  end,	  we	  are	  left	  with	  a	  puzzle	  concerning	  capitalised	  descriptions:	  it	  seems	  that	  neither	  an	  assimilation	  to	  names	  nor	  an	  assimilation	  to	  descriptions	  is	  tenable.	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  an	  adequate	  solution	  to	  this	  puzzle—and	  even	  in	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  One	  of	  the	  few	  mentions	  of	  this	  hybrid	  form	  of	  expression	  is	  found	  in	  Strawson:	  ‘An	  interesting	  intermediate	  position	  is	  occupied	  by	  impure	  proper	  names	  like	  “The	  Round	  Table”—substantival	  phrases	  which	  have	  grown	  capital	  letters’	  (Strawson	  1950,	  p.	  338).	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presence	  of	  certain	  ones—the	  traditional	  distinction	  between	  proper	  names	  and	  definite	  descriptions	  is	  under	  threat.	  The	  aim	  is	  to	  make	  a	  positive	  contribution	  to	   the	   literature	   on	   names	   and	   descriptions	   but	   I	   would	   not	   be	   overly	  disappointed,	   if	   one	   were	   to	   conclude	   the	   following:	   the	   traditional	   taxonomy	  whereby	  there	  is	  an	  important	  linguistic	  distinction	  between	  names	  and	  definite	  descriptions	  does	  not	  hold	  up	  to	  sustained	  scrutiny.	  	  	  
1.	  	  Capitalised	  Descriptions	  	  
Prima	  facie,	  capitalised	  descriptions	  appear	  to	  be	  definite	  descriptions	  where	  the	  restrictor	   phrase	   is	   capitalised,	   i.e.	   they	   seem	   to	   be	   expressions	   that	   are	  constituted	   by	   the	   definite	   article	   ‘the’	   followed	   by	   a	   capitalised	   phrase	  containing	  some	  nouns,	  modifiers,	  and	  complements,	  etc.	  But	  depending	  on	  one’s	  view	  about	  these	  expressions,	  one	  will	  want	  to	  describe	  them	  in	  different	  ways,	  e.g.	  descriptions	  that	  have	  grown	  capitals,	  names	  with	  vestigial	  articles,	  fossilised	  descriptions,	   names	   beginning	   with	   the	   letters	   	   ‘t-­‐h-­‐e’,	   descriptions	   that	   have	  become	  identifying	  tags,	  impure	  names,	  partially	  descriptive	  names,	  etc.	  None	  of	  these	   are	   entirely	   neutral	   but	   ‘descriptions	   which	   have	   grown	   capitals’	   has	  historical	   precedence	   (cf.	   Strawson	   1950,	   p.	   338)	   and	   it	   leaves	   open	   the	  possibility	   that	  when	  descriptions	  grow	  capitals	   they	  become	  proper	  names	  or	  become	  something	  else	  entirely.	  I	  will	  simply	  call	  them	  ‘capitalised	  descriptions’	  for	  short	  but	  keep	  in	  mind	  that	  I	  do	  not	  make	  any	  substantial	  commitments	  by	  doing	  so.	  	   We	   can	   give	   a	   very	   neutral	   (and	   therefore	   not	   very	   useful)	  characterisation	   of	   capitalised	   descriptions	   purely	   in	   terms	   of	   orthography	   as	  follows.	  	  
Orthographic	   characterisation:	   A	   capitalised	   description	   is	   a	   string	   of	  English	   surface	   structure	  of	   the	   form	   ⎡the	  Φ⎤	  where	   the	   sub-­‐string	  Φ	   is	  capitalised.2	  	  Moving	   from	   surface	   features	   to	   syntactic	   features	   it	   seems	   that	   capitalised	  descriptions	   should	   be	   characterised	   as	   definite	   noun	   phrases	   (or	   determiner	  phrases).	  A	   common	  way	   that	   a	   string	  of	  English	   surface	   structure	  of	   the	   form	  
⎡the	  Φ⎤—a	  ‘definite	  description’—is	  analysed	  in	  contemporary	  syntax	  theory	   is	  as	  a	  certain	  kind	  of	  noun	  phrase,	  namely	  a	  definite	  noun	  phrase:	  NP	  =	  [[Det]	  [N]].3	  Accordingly,	  on	  a	   first	  pass,	  we	  might	  analyse	  a	  capitalised	  description,	  such	  as	  ‘the	  Space	  Needle’	  as	  a	  definite	  noun	  phrase	  in	  the	  following	  manner:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  This	   characterisation	  may	  need	  some	   finessing,	  e.g.	   can	   there	  be	  capitalised	  descriptions	   that	  have	  a	  genitive	  construction	  (‘Harper’s	  Ferry’)	  or	  a	  possessive	  construction	  (‘Dead	  Man’s	  Curve’,	  ‘Her	   Majesty’,	   ‘Our	   Father’)?	   A	   further	   potential	   generalisation	   would	   be	   to	   cover	   cases	   from	  other	   languages	   (e.g.	   ‘Il	   Sacro	   Romano	   Impero’	   in	   Italian	   or	   perhaps	   the	   Arabic	   name	   هﻩلﻝلﻝاﺍ,	   i.e.	  ‘Allah’,	  which	  begins	  with	  the	  definite	  article	  لﻝاﺍ,	  i.e.	  ‘Al’.)	  Also	  a	  certain	  form	  of	  apophasis	  might	  be	  thought	  to	  fall	  in	  the	  same	  class	  as	  capitalised	  descriptions,	  e.g.	  ‘He-­‐Who-­‐Must-­‐Not-­‐Be-­‐Named’. 3	  That	  is	  assuming	  a	  standard	  constituent	  structure	  (or	  a	  phrase	  structure	  grammar)	  but	  similar	  points	   could	   be	   made	   assuming,	   for	   example,	   something	   along	   the	   lines	   of	   a	   categorial	  grammar—the	   purported	   analysis	   would	   seem	   to	   have	   analogs	   under	   a	   diverse	   range	   of	  approaches	  to	  syntactic	  theorising.	  And,	  of	  course,	  we	  could	  instead	  analyse	  definite	  descriptions	  as	  determiner	  phrases:	  DP	  =	  [[D]	  [NP]].	  The	  differences	  here	  will	  not	  concern	  us.	  




	  	  More	  interestingly	  capitalised	  descriptions	  appear	  to	  have	  some	  unique	  semantic	  (or	   pragmatic)	   properties.	   They	   seem	   to	   not	   be	   semantically	  descriptive,	   in	   the	  sense	  that,	  for	  example,	  the	  referent	  of	  	  ‘the	  Holy	  Roman	  Empire’	  need	  not	  be	  an	  
x	  such	  that	  x	  is	  holy	  and	  Roman	  and—at	  least	  according	  to	  Voltaire—an	  empire.4	  For	  further	  examples,	  consider	  the	  following	  sentences.	  	   (1)	  The	  Giant’s	  Causeway	  is	  not	  a	  giant’s	  causeway.	  	  (2)	  The	  Hardest	  Logic	  Puzzle	  Ever	  is	  not	  the	  hardest	  logic	  puzzle	  ever.5	  	  (3)	  The	  Morning	  Star	  is	  not	  a	  star.	  	  (4)	  The	  Bridge	  to	  Nowhere	  is	  not	  a	  bridge	  to	  nowhere.	  	  Of	  course,	  there	  are	  also	  many	  examples	  where	  the	  description	  associated	  with	  the	   capitalised	   description	   does	   apply	   to	   the	   entity	   it	   denotes,	   e.g.	   the	   Snowy	  Mountains	  are	  indeed	  snowy,	  the	  Round	  Table	  is	  round,	  the	  Galactic	  Centre	  is	  at	  the	  centre	  of	  our	  galaxy,	  the	  Mad	  Hatter	  is	  a	  mad	  hatter,	  etc.	  In	  such	  cases,	  the	  So-­‐
And-­‐So	  is	  so-­‐called	  precisely	  because	  it	  is	  so-­‐and-­‐so.	  	  	  But	  here	  there	   is	  an	   important	  contrast	  with	  other	  definite	  descriptions.	  The	  inventor	  of	  bifocals	  is	  such	  that	  he	  could	  have	  failed	  to	  be	  an	  inventor.	  The	  following,	   however,	   is	   not	   possible:	   that	   the	   inventor	   of	   bifocals	   fail	   to	   be	   an	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  The	  Holy	  Roman	  Empire	  seems	  to	  have	  been	  an	  empire,	  at	  least	  throughout	  most	  of	  its	  history.	  And	   it	  was	  called	   ‘the	  Holy	  Roman	  Empire’	  because	  of	   its	  association	  with	   its	  emperor,	  namely	  the	   Holy	   Roman	   Emperor.	   The	   Holy	   Roman	   Emperor	   was	   called	   ‘holy’	   in	   part	   due	   to	   the	  coronation	  by	  the	  Pope	  and	  wasn’t	  called	   ‘Roman’	  because	  he	  himself	  was	  Roman—the	  Roman	  Emperor	   needn’t	   be	   Roman	   just	   as	   the	   Australian	   Queen	   is	   not	   Australian.	   For	   these	   reasons	  Voltaire’s	   joke	   is	   not	   as	   straightforward	   as	   it	   may	   at	   first	   seem.	   (Thanks	   to	   Daniel	   Nolan	   for	  discussion	  here.)	  Nevertheless,	  I	  will	  often	  use	  the	  ‘the	  Holy	  Roman	  Emperor’	  as	  a	  paradigmatic	  example	  of	  a	  capitalised	  description	  due	  to	  its	  familiarity.	  	  Other	  capitalised	  descriptions	  such	  as	  ‘the	   Space	   Needle’,	   	   ‘the	   Yellow	   River’,	   or	   ‘the	   Giant’s	   Causeway’	   may,	   in	   the	   end,	   be	   better	  paradigms.	  	  	  5	  The	  Puzzle	  of	  Enlightenment	   is	   certainly	  harder:	  On	  your	   journey	   to	   the	  monastery	  you	  come	  upon	  a	   junction	  with	  three	  roads	   leading	  out,	   the	   left	  road,	   the	  middle	  road	  and	  the	  right	  road.	  There	   is	  a	  monk	  standing	  at	   the	   junction,	  who	  will	   truthfully	  answer	  any	  yes-­‐no	  question,	   if	  he	  can	   do	   so	   without	   contradicting	   himself;	   otherwise	   he	   will	   immediately	   sit	   and	   meditate	   for	  eternity.	  The	  monk	  will	  only	  answer	  one	  question	  per	  traveller.	  	  What	  question	  shall	  you	  ask	  of	  the	  monk	  to	  find	  out	  which	  road	  is	  the	  monastery	  road?	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inventor.	  	  This	  demonstrates	  the	  familiar	  distinction	  between	  a	  de	  re	  reading	  and	  a	  de	  dicto	  reading	  of	  a	  sentence	  such	  as	  ‘The	  inventor	  of	  bifocal	  could	  have	  failed	  to	   be	   an	   inventor’.	   Although	   the	   sentence	   has	   a	   true	  de	   re	   reading	   it	   does	   not	  have	  a	  true	  de	  dicto	  reading	  (where,	  if	  you	  like,	  the	  modal	  takes	  widest	  scope).	  With	   capitalised	   descriptions,	   however,	   the	   situation	   is	   importantly	  different.	   While	   the	   following	   sentences	   unsurprisingly	   permit	   true	   de	   re	  readings,	   they	   also	   have	   true	   de	   dicto	   readings—in	   other	   words,	   given	   the	  relevant	   assumptions	   about	   the	   world,	   the	   following	   sentences	   do	   not	   have	   a	  false	  readings.	  	  (5)	  The	  Snowy	  Mountains	  could	  have	  been	  snowless.	  	  (6)	  The	  Yellow	  River	  could	  have	  been	  pink.	  	  (7)	  The	  Outback	  could	  have	  been	  a	  completely	  developed	  urban	  area.	  	  (8)	  The	  Round	  Table	  could	  have	  been	  square.6	  	  In	  this	  way	  capitalised	  descriptions	  seem	  to	  have	  a	  certain	  semantic	  affinity	  with	  proper	  names.	  This	  non-­‐descriptive	   feature	  of	  proper	  names	  was	  described	  by	  J.S.	  Mill	  as	  follows:	  	   …a	   town	  may	  have	  been	  named	  Dartmouth	  because	   it	   is	   situated	  at	   the	  mouth	  of	  the	  Dart.	  But	  it	  is	  no	  part	  of	  the	  signification	  of	  the	  word…	  to	  be	  situated	  on	  the	  mouth	  of	  the	  Dart.	   If	  sand	  should	  choke	  up	  the	  mouth	  of	  the	  river	  or	  an	  earthquake	  change	  its	  course	  and	  remove	  it	  to	  a	  distance	  from	  the	  town,	  the	  name	  of	  the	  town	  would	  not	  necessarily	  be	  changed…	  Proper	   names	   are	   attached	   to	   the	   objects	   themselves	   and	   are	   not	  dependent	  on	  the	  continuance	  of	  any	  attribute	  of	  the	  object.	  (Mill	  1843,	  p.	  36)7	  	  Theorists	  of	  a	  certain	  persuasion	  may	  wish	  to	  express	  this	  feature	  by	  saying	  that	  capitalised	  descriptions	  are	  directly	  referential,	  or	  that	  they	  are	  rigid	  designators,	  or	   that	   they	   have	   singular	   content,	   or	   that	   they	   are	   Millian—but	   these	  characterisations	  are	  all	   too	  theoretical	  at	   this	  point.	   I	  simply	  want	  to	  highlight	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  For	  example,	  during	  construction	  the	  table-­‐maker	  could	  have	  failed	  to	  cut	  the	  corners	  off	  of	  the	  Round	  Table—it	  wouldn’t	  then	  have	  been	  called	  ‘the	  Round	  Table’	  but	  it	  is	  arguable	  that	  such	  a	  table	  would	  have	  been	  the	  Round	  Table	  (since,	  e.g.,	   it	  was	  constructed	  of	  same	  material	  by	   the	  same	   table-­‐maker	   at	   the	   same	   time	   according	   to	   the	   same	   plans,	   etc.)	   and	   in	   this	   scenario	   it	  would	  have	  been	  square.	  7	  See	  also	  Russell	  1910,	  p.	  123:	  ‘Scott’	  is	  merely	  a	  noise	  or	  shape	  conventionally	  used	  to	  designate	  a	  certain	  person;	  it	  gives	  us	  no	  information	  about	  that	  person,	  and	  has	  nothing	  that	  can	  be	  called	  meaning	  as	  opposed	  to	  denotation…	  But	  ‘the	  author	  of	  Waverley’	  is	  not	  merely	  conventionally	  a	  name	   for	   Scott;	   the	   element	   of	  mere	   convention	   belongs	   here	   to	   the	   separate	  words	   ‘the’	   and	  ‘author’	  and	  ‘of’	  and	  ‘Waverley’.	  Given	  what	  these	  words	  stand	  for,	  ‘the	  author	  of	  Waverley’	  is	  no	  longer	  arbitrary…	  A	  man’s	  name	  is	  what	  he	  is	  called,	  but	  however	  much	  Scott	  had	  been	  called	  the	  author	   of	   Waverley,	   that	   would	   not	   have	   made	   him	   be	   the	   author;	   it	   was	   necessary	   for	   him	  actually	  to	  write	  Waverley,	  which	  was	  a	  fact	  having	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	  names.	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this	   apparent	   semantic	   (or	   pragmatic	   feature),	  which	   any	   linguistic	   analysis	   of	  capitalised	  descriptions	  must	  incorporate.	  	  
Semantic/pragmatic	   characterisation:	  A	  capitalised	  description	  of	   the	  form	  ⎡the	  Φ⎤	  may	  designate	  (or	  be	  used	  to	  refer)	  to	  x	  even	  if	  x	  is	  not	  φ.	  	  These	   rough	   and	   ready	   characterisations	   are	   non-­‐ideal	   in	   certain	   respects	   but	  since	   it	   is	   precisely	   the	   syntactic	   and	   semantic	   properties	   of	   capitalised	  descriptions	   that	   are	   at	   issue,	   we	   can’t	   expect	   to	   do	   much	   better	   without	  sacrificing	   neutrality.	   At	   this	   point	   it	   should	   be	   fairly	   clear	   what	   group	   of	  prototypical	  expressions	  we	  mean	  to	  pick	  out	  by	   ‘capitalised	  descriptions’.	   It	   is	  clear	  enough,	  at	  least,	  to	  begin	  a	  more	  detailed	  investigation	  into	  their	  linguistic	  properties.	  	  	  	  
2.	  	  Assimilation	  to	  Names	  	  The	  most	  straightforward	  treatment	  of	  capitalised	  descriptions	  is	  to	  simply	  treat	  them	  as	  definite	  noun	  phrases	  that	  have	  certain	  unique	  orthographic	  properties	  in	   the	   writing	   system.	   Something	   like	   this	   view	   seems	   to	   be	   endorsed	   in	   the	  following	  quote	  from	  Sørensen	  1958:	  
 The	   fact	   that	  we	  use	   a	   capital	   letter	  when	   ‘the	   channel’	   is	   short	   for	   ‘the	  channel	   between	   England	   and	   France’	   does	   not	   affect	   the	   grammatical	  description	   of	   ‘the	   Channel’.	   (Sørensen	   1958,	   p.	   168;	   qt.	   in	   Anderson	  2003)	  	  	  From	   the	   perspective	   of	   formal	   syntax	   and	   semantics	   this	   is	   to	   say	   that	   such	  expressions	   have	   no	   unique	   or	   interesting	   properties.	   But	   we’ve	   seen	   already	  that	   such	   expressions	   do	   exhibit	   some	   unexpected	   semantic	   characteristics.	   If	  Voltaire	  is	  right,	  then	   ‘the	  Holy	  Roman	  Empire’	  can	  be	  used	  to	  say	  things	  about	  something	  that	  is	  neither	  holy,	  Roman,	  nor	  an	  empire—just	  as	  ‘Dartmouth’	  might	  be	   used	   to	   say	   things	   about	   a	   city	   that	   is	   not	   on	   the	   mouth	   of	   the	   Dart.8	  An	  utterance	   of	   ‘the	   such-­‐and-­‐such	   is	   not	   a	   such-­‐and-­‐such’	   is	   only	   acceptable	   in	  certain	   very	   special	   contexts.9	  For	   these	   reasons	   the	   assimilation	  of	   capitalised	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  	  In	  this	  regard	  it	  may	  be	  fruitful	  to	  consider	  Frege	  puzzles	  involving	  capitalised	  descriptions,	  e.g.	  	  ‘The	  Bambino	  is	  the	  Sultan	  of	  Swat’,	   	   ‘The	  Bridge	  to	  Nowhere	  is	  the	  Gravina	  Island	  Bridge’,	  and	  ‘Ralph	  Waldo	  Emerson	  is	  the	  Sage	  of	  Concord’;	  and	  being	  overly	  loose	  with	  cross-­‐linguistic	  issues	  the	   locus	  classicus	   of	   such	  puzzles	  might	  be	  understood	   to	  employ	  capitalised	  descriptions,	   viz.	  	  ‘Der	  Morgenstern	  ist	  der	  Abendstern’.	  9	  A	   natural	   connection	   here	   that	   I	   won’t	   explore	   is	   the	   idea	   that	   capitalised	   descriptions	   are	  referentially	   used	   definite	   descriptions	   (in	   the	   sense	   of	   Donnellan	   1966),	   where	   perhaps	  capitalisation	   is	  used	  as	   the	  orthographic	   analog	  of	   a	   referential	   intention	   (e.g.	   ‘The	  Man	  in	  the	  
Corner	  Drinking	  a	  Martini	   [referential	   use]	   is	   not	   drinking	   a	  martini’).	   Adopting	   the	  distinction	  between	  speaker	  reference	  and	  semantic	  reference	  (Kripke	  1977)	  would	   lead	  to	   the	  surprising	  result	   that	   capitalised	   descriptions	   often	   lack	   a	   genuine	   semantic	   reference.	   This	   view	   agrees	  with	   my	   negative	   thesis	   that	   capitalised	   descriptions	   are	   not	   proper	   names	   but	   differs	   with	  respect	   to	   my	   suggestion	   about	   how	   to	   account	   for	   the	   apparent	   non-­‐descriptionality	   of	  capitalised	  descriptions.	  I	  leave	  this	  line	  of	  thought	  to	  further	  investigation	  (but	  see	  footnote	  24).	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descriptions	   to	   commonplace	   definite	   noun	   phrases	   (i.e.	   definite	   descriptions)	  seems	  like	  a	  non-­‐starter	  (but	  see	  §3).	  In	   light	   of	   this,	   a	   very	   natural	   idea	   would	   be	   to	   assimilate	   capitalised	  descriptions	   to	  proper	  names.	   In	   fact,	   if	   there	   is	  any	  view	  that	  has	   the	  claim	  to	  being	  the	  orthodox	  view	  on	  capitalised	  descriptions,	  it	   is	  the	  view	  that	  they	  are	  proper	  names.	  For	  example,	  this	  seems	  to	  be	  Saul	  Kripke’s	  position.	  	  It	  should	  not	  be	  thought	  that	  every	  phrase	  of	  the	  form	  ‘the	  x	  such	  that	  Fx’	  is	   always	   used	   in	   English	   as	   a	   description	   rather	   than	   a	   name.	   I	   guess	  everyone	   has	   heard	   about	   The	   Holy	   Roman	   Empire,	   which	  was	   neither	  holy,	  Roman,	  nor	  an	  empire.	  Today	  we	  have	  The	  United	  Nations.	  Here	   it	  would	  seem	  that	  since	  these	  things	  can	  be	  so-­‐called	  even	  though	  they	  are	  not	  Holy	  Roman	  United	  Nations,	  these	  phrases	  should	  be	  regarded	  not	  as	  definite	  descriptions,	  but	  as	  names.	  (Kripke	  1980,	  p.	  26)	  	  And	  it	  also	  seems	  to	  have	  been	  the	  view	  of	  Ruth	  Barcan	  Marcus.	  	   …	   it	   often	   happens,	   in	   a	   growing,	   changing	   language,	   that	   a	   descriptive	  phrase	  comes	  to	  be	  used	  as	  a	  proper	  name—an	  identifying	  tag—and	  the	  descriptive	  meaning	  is	  lost	  or	  ignored.	  Sometimes	  we	  use	  certain	  devices	  such	   as	   capitalization	   and	   dropping	   the	   definite	   article,	   to	   indicate	   the	  change	   in	   use.	   ‘The	   evening	   star’	   becomes	   ‘Evening	   Star’,	   ‘the	   morning	  star’	  becomes	  ‘Morning	  Star’,	  and	  they	  may	  come	  to	  be	  used	  as	  names	  for	  the	   same	   thing.	   Singular	   descriptions	   such	   as	   ‘the	   little	   corporal’,	   ‘the	  Prince	  of	  Denmark’,	   ‘the	  sage	  of	  Concord’,	  or	   ‘the	  great	  dissenter’,	  are	  as	  we	   know	   often	   used	   as	   alternative	   proper	   names	   of	   Napoleon,	   Hamlet,	  Thoreau	  and	  Oliver	  Wendell	  Holmes.	  (Marcus	  1961,	  p.	  309)	  	  But	   what	   does	   this	   orthodox	   view	   come	   to	   exactly?	   Given	   some	   standard	  assumptions,	  if	  descriptions	  which	  have	  grown	  capital	  letters	  are	  proper	  names,	  then	  they	  are	  not	  descriptions	  at	  all.	  	  The	  Marcus	  view	  can	  be	  read	  as	  providing	  a	  certain	   philological	   or	   etymological	   story	   about	   how	   capitalised	   descriptions	  have	   evolved	   into	   proper	   names,	   and	   perhaps	   as	   a	   story	   about	   the	   genesis	   of	  proper	   names	   themselves:	   Certain	   linguistic	   expressions	   started	   their	   lives	   as	  normal	   definite	   descriptions,	   but	   over	   time	   the	   definite	   description	   became	  conventionally	   associated	   with	   just	   one	   bearer	   and	   it	   lost	   its	   descriptive	  meaning—it	  became	  rigid—and	  this	  change	  in	  use	  was	  accompanied	  by	  a	  change	  in	   the	   orthographic	   representation	   of	   the	   expression—it	   became	   capitalised.10	  (Eventually,	   perhaps	   the	   expression	   even	   goes	   on	   to	   grow	   out	   of	   its	   ‘the’	   and	  become	  a	  proper	  proper	  name.)	  	  According	  to	  this	  view	  capitalised	  descriptions	  have	  vestigial	  articles	  due	  to	   some	   historical	   contingencies	   concerning	   their	   evolution,	   but	   they	   are,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  Various	   naming-­‐taboos	   are	   often	   the	   impetuous	   for	   the	   development	   of	   new	   capitalised	  descriptions.	  For	  example,	  consider	  various	  names	  of	  God	  in	  Judaism	  (e.g.	  ‘The	  Eternal	  One’),	  or	  alternative	  names	  of	  Chinese	  emperors	  (e.g.	  ‘His	  Majesty	  the	  Emperor’).	  Also	  some	  cultures	  have	  a	   taboo	  against	  speaking	  the	  names	  of	   the	  dead	  (e.g.	  some	  aboriginal	  Australian	  cultures,	  some	  native	  Pacific	  Northwest	  cultures,	  among	  others).	  One	  can	   imagine	  how	  given	  that	  reference	  to	  the	  deceased	  could	  be	  achieved	  via	  a	  definite	  description	   that	   these	  descriptions	  might	   in	   time	  ‘grow	  capitals’	  and—ironically—become	  alternative	  names	  of	  the	  deceased.	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nevertheless,	   proper	   names. 11 	  The	   evolutionary	   story	   sounds	   plausible	   for	  certain	   cases.	   Be	   that	   as	   it	   may,	   here	   we	   are	   not	   primarily	   concerned	   with	  historical	   linguistics	  per	  se;	   instead	  we	  are	  primarily	   concerned	  with	   the	   claim	  that	   capitalised	  descriptions	  are	   proper	  names.	  On	   this	   point,	  Kripke	   says	   that	  they	   should	   be	   ‘regarded	   as	   names’	   and	  Marcus	   says	   that	   they	   are	   ‘alternative	  proper	  names’.12	  	  	  
2.1	  Syntactically	  Simple	  Names	  
	  A	   natural	   way	   to	   read	   the	   orthodox	   view	   is	   as	   the	   claim	   that	   capitalised	  descriptions	  fall	  into	  the	  same	  linguistic	  categories	  as	  proper	  names.	  Names	  are	  traditionally	   assumed	   to	   be	   syntactically	   simple	   and	   are	   analogised	   to	   the	  constants	  in	  first-­‐order	  logic.	  Names	  such	  as	  ‘Theodore’	  are	  usually	  thought	  to	  be	  syntactically	   simple	   singular	   terms	   like	  pronouns	   (e.g.	   ‘she’,	   or	   ‘I’).	   So	   it	   seems	  that	  a	  natural	  view	  would	  be	  that	   the	  string	   ‘the’	  no	  more	  occurs	   in	  capitalised	  descriptions	   than	   it	  does	   in	   the	  name	   ‘Theodore’.	  That	   is,	   the	   ‘the’	   in	   ‘The	  Holy	  Roman	  Empire’	   is	  accidental	   in	   the	  sense	  of	  Quine	  1953	  (just	  as	   the	  string	   ‘cat’	  occurs	   as	   an	   orthographic	   accident	   in	   ‘cattle’)—or	   at	   the	   very	   least	   the	   ‘the’	   is	  expletive,	  or	  somehow	  not	  morphologically	  significant.	  	  This	   view	   faces	   some	   serious	   obstacles.	   First	   we	   should	   notice	   that	  capitalised	   descriptions	   just	   like	   common	   definite	   descriptions	   allow	   for	   the	  interposition	  of	  adjectives	  in	  the	  following	  sense:	  	  (9)	  the	  Space	  Needle	  ⇒	  the	  605-­‐foot	  Space	  Needle	  	  (10)	  the	  Outback	  ⇒	  the	  desolate	  Outback	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  Such	   a	   position	   is	   echoed	   by	   Abbott	   (2002,	   pp.	   193-­‐194),	   who	   says	   ‘…	   sometimes	   proper	  names	   take	   the	   form	   of	   a	   definite	   description,	   or	   (primarily	   in	   other	   languages)	   occur	   with	   a	  definite	  article,	  as	   ‘The	  Round	  Table’,	   ‘die	  Jutta’…	  The	  first,	  exemplified	  by	  ‘The	  Round	  Table’,	   is	  one	  in	  which	  a	  definite	  description	  has	  ‘grown	  capital	  letters’,	  to	  use	  Strawson’s	  happy	  phrase…	  That	   is,	   the	   definite	   description	   has	   become	   a	   proper	   name,	   as	   signalled	   by	   the	   spelling	  convention	  associated	  with	  proper	  names…	   [In	   this	   case]	   the	  occurrence	  of	   the	  definite	   article	  preceded	   the	   metamorphosis	   into	   a	   proper	   name.	   Presumably	   that	   metamorphosis	   was	   not	  caused	   by	   the	   presence	   of	   the	   article	   (otherwise	   definite	   descriptions	   in	   general	   would	   occur	  capitalized),	  but	  rather	  by	  the	  prominence	  of	  the	  referent—its	  uniqueness	  and/or	  familiarity	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  discourse	  contexts’.	  12	  See	   also	   Church	   (1956,	   p.	   3),	  who	   classifies	   ‘Rembrandt’,	   ‘Caracas’,	   ‘Sirius’,	   ‘the	  Mississippi’,	  and	  ‘The	  Odyssey’	  as	  ‘proper	  names	  which	  are	  arbitrarily	  assigned	  to	  denote	  in	  a	  certain	  way’	  in	  contrast	   to	   ‘names	   having	   a	   structure	   that	   expresses	   some	   analysis	   of	   the	   way	   in	   which	   they	  denote’,	  e.g.	  ‘the	  author	  of	  Waverley’,	   ‘the	  cube	  of	  2’.	  Although	  Church	  uses	  the	  old	  Fregean	  (but	  now	  non-­‐standard)	  categorisation	  whereby	  both	  ‘Rembrandt’	  and	  ‘the	  author	  of	  Waverley’	  count	  as	   “eigennamen”	   or	   “proper	   names”	   (in	   the	   sense	   that	   they	   are	   both	   referring	   expressions),	  notice	   that	  he	  also	  distinguishes	  between	  those	  terms	  which	  are	  arbitrarily	  assigned	  a	  referent	  and	   those	   which	   have	   a	   complex	   linguistic	   structure—‘the	   Mississippi’	   is	   classed	   with	  ‘Rembrandt’	  not	  ‘the	  author	  of	  Waverley’.	  But	  he	  does	  caution	  as	  follows	  (Church	  1956,	  p.	  3):	  ‘The	  distinction	  is	  not	  always	  clear	  in	  the	  natural	  languages	  between	  the	  two	  kinds	  of	  proper	  names,	  those	  which	  are	  arbitrarily	  assigned	  to	  have	  a	  certain	  meaning…and	  those	  which	  have	  a	  linguistic	  structure	  of	  meaningful	  parts.	  E.g.	  “The	  Odyssey”	  has	  in	  the	  Greek	  a	  derivation	  from	  “Odysseus”,	  and	  it	  may	  be	  debated	  whether	  this	  etymology	  is	  a	  mere	  matter	  of	  past	  history	  or	  whether	  it	   is	  still	   to	  be	  considered	  in	  modern	  English	  that	  the	  name	  “The	  Odyssey”	  has	  a	  structure	  involving	  the	  name	  “Odysseus”.’	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  (11)	  the	  Holy	  Roman	  Empire	  ⇒	  the	  decadent	  Holy	  Roman	  Empire	  	  (12)	  the	  Mississippi	  River	  ⇒	  the	  mighty	  Mississippi	  River13	  	  Call	   this	   the	  Problem	  of	   Interposed	  Adjectives.	   This	   problem	   seems	   rule	   out	   the	  simple	   view	   that	   capitalised	   descriptions	   should	   be	   assimilated	   to	   the	   likes	   of	  ‘Theodore’.	  We	   can’t	   interpose	   an	   adjective	   into	   ‘Theodore’	   to	   get	   ‘The	  mighty	  odore’!14	  Or	   can	   we?	   One	   might	   hope	   to	   find	   a	   way	   around	   this	   problem	   by	  appealing	   some	   form	   of	   tmesis	   or	   infixation	   phenomena,	   e.g.	   ‘un-­‐fucking-­‐believable’,	   ‘a-­‐whole-­‐nother’,	   or	   ‘guaran-­‐damn-­‐tee’	   (McMillan	   1980).	   Here	   we	  
can	   infix	  meaningful	  syntax	  right	   in	   the	  middle	  of	  a	  proper	  name.	  For	  example,	  from	   ‘Kathmandu’	  we	   can	   go	   to	   ‘Kathman-­‐fucking-­‐du’—as	   in,	   ‘I’m	   gonna	   get	   a	  one-­‐way	  ticket	  to	  Kathman-­‐fucking-­‐du	  and	  never	  look	  back’.	  But	  the	  relationship	  between	   ‘the	  Space	  Needle’	   and	   ‘the	  605-­‐foot	   Space	  Needle’	   seems	  much	  more	  mundane	   than	   such	   infixation—it	   seems	   to	   be	   more	   or	   less	   the	   same	   as	   the	  relationship	   between	   	   ‘the	   author	   of	  Waverley’	   and	   ‘the	   anonymous	   author	   of	  Waverley’;	  or	  ‘the	  inventor	  of	  bifocals’	  and	  ‘the	  ingenious	  inventor	  of	  bifocals’;	  or	  ‘my	   wife’	   and	   ‘my	   beautiful	   wife’.	   	   Given	   this,	   an	   appeal	   to	   infixation,	   though	  initially	  tempting,	  doesn’t	  seem	  very	  well	  motivated	  in	  this	  case.	  But	   there	   are	   other	   options.	   And	   a	   certain	   similarity	   to	   the	   examples	  above	  highlights	  a	  distinctive	   feature	  of	   the	   interposed	  modifiers	   (e.g.	   ‘mighty’,	  ‘decadent’,	   ‘ingenious’)	   in	   these	   cases,	   namely	   they	   seem	   to	   have	   only	   an	  appositive	  (or	  nonrestrictive)	  effect,	  rather	  than	  a	  restrictive	  one.15	  This	   is	  to	  say	  that	   it	  seems	  that	   ‘the	  mighty	  Mississippi’	  means	  more-­‐or-­‐less	   the	   same	   thing	   as	   ‘the	   Mississippi,	   which	   is	   mighty’—in	   contrast	   to	   ‘the	  Mississippi	  that	  is	  mighty’.	  Given	  this	  one	  might	  insist	  that	  at	  the	  level	  of	  logical	  form	  ‘the	  Mississippi’	  should	  still	  be	  treated	  as	  a	  syntactic	  (and	  semantic	  unit)	  in	  spite	   of	   the	   interposed	   adjectives	   in	   the	   surface	   structure.	   To	   motivate	   this	  consider	  the	  following	  example.	  	  	  (14a)	  The	  605	  ft.	  Space	  Needle	  was	  built	  in	  1962.	  	  	  (14b)	  The	  Space	  Needle	  that	  is	  605	  ft.	  tall	  was	  built	  in	  1962.	  	  	  (14c)	  The	  Space	  Needle,	  which	  is	  605	  ft.	  tall,	  was	  built	  in	  1962.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  In	   Twain's	   (1883)	   memoir	   Life	   on	   the	   Mississippi	   he	   speaks	   of	   ‘the	   great	   Mississippi,	   the	  majestic,	  the	  magnificent	  Mississippi,	  rolling	  its	  mile-­‐wide	  tide	  along,	  shining	  in	  the	  sun’	  and	  ‘the	  turbulent	  and	  blood-­‐stained	  Mississippi’.	  14 	  Paolo	   Santorio	   has	   called	   my	   attention	   to	   cases	   where	   expressions	   that	   appear	   to	   be	  capitalised	   descriptions	   don’t	   seem	   to	   allow	   for	   interposing.	   Such	   cases	   come	   from	   what	   we	  might	  call	  ‘titles’,	  e.g.	  names	  of	  books,	  movies,	  plays,	  etc.	  Compare	  (i)	  to	  (ii).	  	   (i)	  In	  the	  absurdist-­‐tinged	  The	  Stranger,	  Camus	  examines	  the	  arbitrariness	  of	  justice.	  (ii)	  #	  In	  the	  absurdist-­‐tinged	  Stranger,	  Camus	  examines	  the	  arbitrariness	  of	  justice.	  	  15	  I	  owe	  this	  observation	  to	  Anders	  Schoubye.	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Here	   one	   can	   make	   that	   case	   that	   (14a)	   and	   (14b)	   have	   different	   truth-­‐conditions—the	  latter	  requires	  that	  the	  Space	  Needle	  be	  605	  ft.	  tall,	  whereas	  the	  former	  doesn’t	  (for	  further	  discussion	  of	  the	  truth	  conditions	  of	  sentences	  with	  appositives	  see	  Dever	  2001,	  pp.	  293-­‐300).16	  But	  without	  making	  a	  commitment	  on	  that	  issue	  one	  might	  insist	  that	  (14a)	  is	  a	  stylistic	  variant	  of	  (14c),	  where	  the	  adjective	  ‘605	  ft.	  tall’	  occurs	  in	  a	  nonrestrictive	  relative	  clause.	  And	  given	  such	  an	  analysis	   in	   terms	   of	   nonrestrictive	   clauses	   one	   might	   appeal	   to	   a	   form	   of	  displaced	   syntactic	   structure	   to	   circumvent	   the	   Problem	   of	   Interposed	  Adjectives.	  	  For	  example,	  Quine	   (1960,	  p.	  110)	   insists	   that	   sentences	   like	   (14c)	  with	  nonrestrictive	  relative	  clauses	  are	  ‘only	  stylistic	  variants	  of	  coordinate	  sentences’	  (cf.	   	  Dever	  2001,	  p.	  295-­‐300	  who	  treats	  sentences	  with	  appositives	  as	  syntactic	  trees	  with	   two	   roots).	  Whether	  we	   cash	   out	   the	   syntactic	   displacement	   of	   the	  nonrestrictive	   clause	   in	   terms	   of	   two	   distinct	   sentences	   or	   just	   in	   terms	   of	  movement	   of	   the	   adjective	   away	   from	   the	   capitalised	   description,	   the	   upshot	  would	  be	  that	  ‘the	  mighty	  Mississippi’	  shouldn’t	  be	  parsed	  as	  tree	  (A)	  but	  instead	  as	  a	   structure	  where	   ‘the	  Mississippi’	  occupies	   its	  own	   terminal	  node	   (e.g.	   tree	  (B)).17	  	  
A.	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  B.	  
	  	  Such	   an	   analysis	   might	   seem	   plausible	   for	   nonrestrictive	   intersective	  modification—though	  non-­‐intersective	  modification	  is	  another	  story.	  (Note	  also	  that	   there	  are	  cases	  of	  apparent	  restrictive	  modification	  as	  well,	  e.g.	   ‘There	  are	  two	  Yellow	  rivers	  in	  the	  Mississippi	  river	  watershed.	  We	  live	  on	  the	  small	  Yellow	  river,	  not	  the	  big	  one.’)	  	  	  But	  even	  if	  an	  appeal	  to	  syntactic	  displacement	  (or	  infixation	  phenomena)	  can	   be	   used	   to	   blunt	   the	   Problem	   of	   Interposed	   Adjectives	   a	   deeper	   problem	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  The	   type	   of	   evidence	   Dever	   points	   to	   is	   sentences	   like	   ‘Plato,	   the	   greatest	  metaphysician	   of	  antiquity,	  wrote	   the	  Cratylus’,	   see	  also	   	  McCawley	  1981	  on	   the	  syntax	  of	  nonrestrictive	  relative	  clauses.	  17	  	   An	   interesting	   connection	   to	   the	  predicate	  views	  of	  names	   is	  how	   to	   treat	  modified	  proper	  names	   with	   nonrestrictive	   modifiers,	   e.g.	   ‘the	   controversial	   Noam	   Chomsky’	   (or	   ‘the	   famous	  detective	  Sherlock	  Holmes’).	  This	   is	  not	  syntactically	  on	  a	  par	  with	  `the	  Noam	  Chomsky,	  who	  is	  controversial'	  (is	  it?)	  as	  the	  analysis	  above	  would	  have	  it.	  Of	  course,	  here	  there	  are	  similar	  cases	  with	  restrictive	  modifiers	  as	  well,	  e.g.	   ‘the	  early	  Wittgenstein’.	   	  See	  Sloat	  (1969,	  pp.	  27-­‐29)	  and	  Matushansky	  (2008,	  pp.	  604-­‐605)	  for	  further	  discussion	  of	  (restrictive/nonrestrictive)	  modified	  proper	  names.	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remains.	  If	  the	  ‘The’	  in	  ‘The	  Holy	  Roman	  Empire’	  were	  accidental	  like	  the	  ‘The’	  in	  ‘Theodore’	   or	   if	   ‘The	  Holy	   Roman	   Empire’	   occupied	   a	   terminal	   node	   at	   logical	  form,	  then	  we	  wouldn’t	  expect	   ‘Holy	  Roman	  Empire’	  to	  take	  other	  determiners.	  	  But,	  of	  course,	  it	  does.18	  	  	   That	   is,	   the	   relevant	   capitalised	   nouns	   can	   take	   other	   determiners	   in	  addition	  to	  the	  definite	  article,	  e.g.	   ‘no’	  and	   	   ‘a’	  (and	  even	   ‘two’,	   ‘some’,	  etc.)	  (cf.	  Matushansky	  2008,	  p.	  579,	  who	  provides	   the	  examples	   ‘our	  ugly	   little	  Thames’	  and	  ‘this	  beautiful	  Sudan	  of	  ours’).	  	   (15)	  There	  was	  no	  Holy	  Roman	  Empire	  before	  Charlemagne.	  	  (16)	  Without	   the	   efforts	   of	   J.	   Edgar	  Hoover	   there	  wouldn't	   have	  been	  a	  Federal	  Bureau	  of	  Investigation.	  	  	  	   (17)	  There	  are	  two	  Yellow	  rivers	  in	  the	  Mississippi	  river	  watershed.	  	   (18)	  If	  not	  for	  private	  funding	  there	  might	  not	  have	  been	  a	  Space	  Needle.	  	  Call	   this	   the	   Problem	   of	   Other	   Determiners.	   In	   this	   case	   neither	   an	   appeal	   to	  infixation	  nor	  syntactic	  displacement	  provides	  any	  resources	  to	  save	  the	  simple	  syntax	   view.	   One	   could	   make	   a	   desperate	   appeal	   to	   a	   widespread	   kind	   of	  homonymy	   such	   that	   e.g.	   the	   expression	   ‘Space	  Needle’	   that	   occurs	   in	   ‘a	   Space	  Needle’	  does	  not	  occur	  in	  ‘the	  Space	  Needle’,	  but	  we	  shall	  ignore	  this	  “lazy	  man’s	  approach”.	  	  The	   evidence	   appears	   to	   conclusively	   establish	   that	   capitalised	  descriptions	   have	   a	   complex	   internal	   syntax.	   We’ve	   seen	   that	   capitalised	  descriptions	  seem	  to	  be	  syntactically	  structured	   just	   like	  definite	  noun	  phrases	  and	  that	  the	  restrictor	  clause	  can	  occur	  with	  other	  determiners	  to	  make	  up	  other	  noun	  phrases	  (e.g.	  indefinite	  noun	  phrases).19	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  	   I	   owe	   this	   observation	   to	   James	   Shaw,	   who	   called	   my	   attention	   to	   such	   examples	   in	   his	  commentary	  on	  an	  early	  version	  of	  this	  paper	  at	  the	  APA	  in	  Seattle.	  19	  	   In	   light	   of	   this	   ‘definite	   descriptions	   which	   have	   grown	   capital	   letters’	   may	   be	   a	   bit	   of	   a	  misnomer,	  since	  there	  seem	  to	  be	  many	  indefinites	  with	  ‘grown	  capitals’	  as	  well,	  e.g.	  ‘A	  Bridge	  to	  Nowhere’.	  (Note	  that	  there	  are	  many	  Bridges	  to	  Nowhere,	  there	  is	  an	  Alaskan	  Bridge	  to	  Nowhere,	  a	   Californian	  Bridge	   to	  Nowhere;	   and	   there	   are	   the	   infamous	  Glaswegian	  Bridges	   to	  Nowhere,	  among	  others.)	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2.2	  Syntactically	  Complex	  Names	  	  What,	  then,	  remains	  of	  the	  view	  that	  capitalised	  descriptions	  are	  proper	  names?	  Might	   there	  be	   a	  more	   sophisticated	   assimilation	  of	   capitalised	  descriptions	   to	  proper	   names?	   Any	   such	   view	   must	   allow	   that	   some	   proper	   names	   have	   a	  complex	   internal	   syntax.	   To	   do	   so,	   however,	   threatens	   to	   undermine	   any	  principled	   distinction	   between	   proper	   names	   and	   definite	   descriptions.	   If	   ‘the	  Mississippi’	   is	  treated	  as	  a	  definite	  noun	  phrase	  with	  a	  complex	  internal	  syntax	  and	   compositional	   semantics,	   what	   does	   the	   claim	   that	   ‘the	   Mississippi’	   is	   a	  proper	  name	  come	  to?20	  In	   philosophical	   circles,	   where	   proper	   names	   are	   analogised	   to	   the	  constants	   of	   first-­‐order	   logic,	   such	   a	   view	   of	   proper	   names	   would	   be	   very	  unorthodox.	  For	  example,	  Russell	  states,	  	  The	  distinction	  between	  a	  name	  and	  all	  other	  symbols	  may	  be	  explained	  as	  follows:	  A	  name	  is	  a	  simple	  symbol	  whose	  meaning	  is	  something	  that	  can	   only	   occur	   as	   subject…	   And	   a	   ‘simple’	   symbol	   is	   one	  which	   has	   no	  parts	  that	  are	  symbols.	  Thus	  ‘Scott'’	  is	  a	  simple	  symbol,	  because,	  though	  it	  has	  parts	  (namely,	  separate	   letters),	   these	  parts	  are	  not	  symbols.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	   ‘the	  author	  of	  Waverley’	   is	  not	  a	  simple	  symbol,	  because	  the	  separate	   words	   that	   compose	   the	   phrase	   are	   parts	   which	   are	   symbols.	  (Russell	  1919,	  p.	  173)	  	  The	  supposed	  syntactic	  simplicity	  of	  names	  is	  often	  thought	  to	  be	  of	  great	  import	  and	   appealed	   to	   in	   support	   of	   their	   semantic	   simplicity,	   or	   in	   support	   of	   their	  status	  as	  genuine	  devices	  of	  reference	  (see,	  e.g.,	  contemporary	  philosophers	  such	  as	  Neale	  1993	  or	  Salmon	  1989).21	  Yet,	   in	   linguistic	   circles	   the	   idea	   that	   proper	   names	   have	   a	   complex	  internal	  syntax	  is	  commonplace.	  According	  to	  this	  picture	  the	  category	  of	  ‘proper	  names’	  manifest	  in	  a	  multitude	  of	  noun	  phrase	  grammatical	  forms.	  For	  example,	  in	  Huddleston	  (1984)	  we	  find	  a	  distinction	  between	  ‘proper	  nouns’	  and	  ‘proper	  names’	   (see	   pp.	   229-­‐231	   and	   see	   also	   Payne	   and	   Huddleston	   2002).	   A	   proper	  
noun	   is	   a	   certain	   kind	   of	   syntactically	   simple	   expression	   of	   the	   class	   noun,	  whereas	   a	  proper	  name	   is	   a	   certain	   kind	   of	   (potentially)	   syntactically	   complex	  noun	   phrase.	   For	   example,	   the	   proper	   name	   ‘New	   Zealand’	   is	   complex—its	  constituents	  are	   the	  adjective	   ‘new’	  and	   the	  proper	  noun	   ‘Zealand’.	   	   So,	  on	   this	  view	   the	   expression	   ‘the	   Mississippi	   river’	   is	   a	   proper	   name	   syntactically	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  For	  example,	  assume	  that	  the	  semantic	  value	  of	  the	  determiner	  ‘the’	  is	  type	  ((e,t),((e,t),t))	  and	  ‘Mississippi’	  has	  a	  predicate	  value	  of	  type	  (e,t)	  such	  that	  the	  semantic	  type	  of	  ‘the	  Mississippi’	  is	  ((e,t),t).	  In	  what	  theoretical	  sense	  is	  this	  a	  proper	  name	  as	  opposed	  to	  a	  definite	  description?	  	  Of	  course,	  there	  are	  views	  where	  proper	  names	  are	  also	  type	  ((e,t),t)	  (e.g.	  	  Montague	  1973),	  but	  on	  many	  (if	  not	  most)	  philosophical	  views	  proper	  names	  are	  type	  e.	  21	  Salmon	   1989	   states	   that	   his	   central	   thesis	   is	   ‘that	   ordinary	   proper	   names,	   demonstratives,	  other	  single-­‐word	  indexicals	  or	  pronouns	  (such	  as	  ‘he’),	  and	  other	  simple	  singular	  terms	  are,	  in	  a	  given	  possible	  context	  of	  use,	  Russellian	  “genuine	  names	  in	  the	  strict	  logical	  sense”’	  (p.	  211)	  and	  reveals	   that	   ‘it	  was	   [the	  argument	  by	  analogy	   to	  variables	  and	  pronouns]	  more	   than	  any	  other	  that	  actually	  convinced	  me	  of	  the	  highly	  contentious	  thesis	  that	  the	  information	  value	  of	  a	  proper	  name,	   or	   other	   closed	   simple	   singular	   term,	   is	   simply	   its	   referent	   and	   nothing	  more’	   (p.	   219,	  footnote	  3).	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composed	  of	  the	  determiner	  ‘the’,	  the	  proper	  noun	  ‘Mississippi’,	  and	  the	  common	  noun	  ‘river’.	  A	  first	  question	  to	  ask	  about	  this	  taxonomy	  is	  what	  distinguishes	  proper	  names	   from	   other	   definite	   noun	   phrases	   (if	   anything).	   Given	   the	   examples	  describe	   above	   it	  may	   seem	   that	   proper	   names	   are	   noun	   phrases	   that	   feature	  proper	   nouns	   as	   parts	   (and	   perhaps	   in	   some	   privileged	   syntactic	   position),	  whereas	   mere	   definite	   descriptions	   fail	   to	   contain	   a	   proper	   noun.	   But	   this	   is	  explicitly	  rejected	  by	  Huddleston	  1984,	  who	  says	  ‘…“Central	  Station”	  is	  a	  proper	  name	   containing	   no	   proper	   noun	   at	   all”	   (p.	   230)—notice	   that	   ‘central’	   and	  ‘station’	  are	  both	  common	  nouns.	  Presumably,	   then,	   the	  capitalised	  description	  ‘the	  Golden	  Gate	  Bridge’	   is	  also	  a	  proper	  name	  containing	  no	  proper	  nouns	  (cf.	  Cumming	  2013,	  §1).	  In	   fact,	   the	   theorists	   that	   appeal	   to	   the	   proper	   name/proper	   noun	  distinction	   don’t	   provide	   a	   sharp	   syntactic	   or	   semantic	   demarcation	   between	  noun	  phrases	  which	  are	  proper	  names	  and	  noun	  phrases	  which	  are	  not.	  Instead,	  what	  one	   finds	   is	  an	  appeal	   to	  extra-­‐syntactic	  conventions	  of	  use.	  For	  example,	  Huddleston	  suggests	  the	  following.	  	  What	   makes	   a	   proper	   name	   different	   from	   a	   (mere)	   description	   is	   the	  conventional	  association	  between	  the	  name	  and	  its	  bearer:	  in	  the	  central	  case	   names	   are	   institutionalised—for	   example,	   by	   some	   kind	   of	  registration.	  (Huddleston	  1984,	  p.	  230)	  	  The	  Huddleston	  taxonomy	  is	  not	  attempting	  to	  carve	  the	  language	  at	  it	  syntactic	  joints—instead	   it	   simply	  aims	   to	  provide	   further	  classification	  of	  noun	  phrases	  by	  way	  of	  their	  pragmatic	  uses.22	  If	  so,	  then	  the	  difference	  between	  proper	  nouns	  and	   common	   nouns	   is	   not	   a	   genuine	   grammatical	   distinction	   but	   is	   instead	   a	  pragmatic	   distinction—it	   concerns,	   e.g.,	   to	   what	   different	   uses	   we	   put	   the	  univocal	  expression	  ‘the	  golden	  gate	  bridge’.23	  This	  would	  be	  in	  line	  with	  Coates’	  (2006;	   2009)	   position	   that	   properhood	   is	   a	   category	   of	   linguistic	   usage	   not	   a	  category	  of	  linguistic	  expressions,	  per	  se.	  	   Properhood	   is	   something	   speakers	   do,	   not	   something	   that	   expressions	  have.	  Properhood	  is	  not	  a	  structural	  or	  quasi-­‐lexical	  category…	  The	  First	  
World	   War	   is	   in	   itself,	   as	   an	   expression	   and	   like	   all	   noun	   phrase	  expressions,	  neither	  common	  nor	  proper,	  but	  may	  be	  used	  to	  refer	  either	  semantically	  or	  onymically	  on	  a	  given	  occasion.	  (Coates	  2009,	  p.	  437-­‐439)	  	   Expressions	   such	   as	  The	  Pope,	  The	  Sun,	  The	  Zodiac,	  The	  Milky	  Way,	  The	  
Glorious	   Revolution,	   The	   Long	   Parliament,	   and	   so	   forth…,	   are	   proper	  names	   just	   in	   case	   they	   are	   used	   to	   refer	   onymically,	   that	   is,	   with	   no	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  Huddleston	  (1984,	  p.	  230)	  comes	  close	  to	  making	  a	  claim	  about	  the	  semantic	  (or	  pragmatic)	  differences	  between	  proper	  names	  and	  other	  determiner	  phrases	  when	  he	   says	   ‘...the	   fact	   that	  there	  are	  now	  two	  other	  universities	  in	  the	  state	  does	  not	  make	  the	  University	  of	  Queensland	  any	  less	  appropriate	  as	  a	  means	  of	  referring	  to	  it—precisely	  because	  it	  is	  the	  institutionalised	  name.’	  23	  	   One	   might	   instead	   insist	   that	   there	   are	   homonyms	   here—distinct	   expression	   types	   with	  distinct	  semantic	  properties.	  Although	  the	  individuation	  of	  words	  is	  notoriously	  tricky,	  cf.	  Kaplan	  1990.	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appeal	  to	  any	  sense	  possessed	  by	  their	  constituents	  linked	  in	  a	  particular	  grammatical	  structure.	  (Coates	  2006,	  p.	  372)	  	  On	   this	   view	   ‘the	  Golden	  Gate	  Bridge’	   is	  both	   a	   proper	  name	  and	  not	   a	  proper	  name	   relative	   to	   different	   occasions	   of	   use	   (and	   depending	   on	   the	   particular	  intentions	  or	  commitments	  of	  the	  speaker).	  But	  as	  such	  it	  simply	  denies	  that	  the	  complex	  expressions	  ‘the	  Golden	  Gate	  Bridge’	  and	  ‘the	  golden	  gate	  bridge’	  differ	  with	   respect	   to	   their	   syntactic	   and	   semantic	   properties.24	  Coates	   can	  maintain	  that	  ‘the	  Golden	  Gate	  Bridge’	  is	  a	  proper	  name	  (as	  used	  by	  a	  speaker	  at	  a	  time),	  but	  according	  to	  his	  view	  it	  is	  also	  true	  that	  ‘the	  inventor	  of	  bifocals’	  is	  a	  proper	  name	   (as	   used	   by	   a	   speaker	   at	   a	   time).	   While	   I	   have	   no	   objection	   to	   Coates’	  negative	   thesis	   that	   the	   category	   ‘proper	   name’	   fails	   to	   carve	   a	   relevant	  distinction	  among	  linguistic	  expressions,	  the	  positive	  account	  of	  properhood	  is	  of	  no	  use	  to	  the	  theorist	  who	  wishes	  to	  assimilate	  capitalised	  descriptions	  to	  proper	  names,	   since	   the	   only	   sense	   in	   which	   capitalised	   descriptions	   are	   names	   also	  applies	  to	  run-­‐of-­‐the-­‐mill	  definite	  descriptions.	  	  Huddleston	   (1984)	   does	   not	   provide	   such	   a	   detailed	   account	   of	  properhood	   but	   as	   such	   the	   taxonomy	   is	   simply	   underdeveloped	   for	   our	  purposes.	   As	   stated	   it	   provides	   neither	   a	   syntactic	   nor	   a	   semantic	   distinction	  between	  names	  and	  definite	  descriptions—it	  appeals	  instead	  to	  the	  pragmatic	  or	  pre-­‐semantic	  notion	  of	  a	   	   ‘conventional	  association’.	   	  One	  possible	  development	  of	  a	  view	  along	   these	   lines	  might	  go	   like	   this:	  Proper	  names	  are	  noun	  phrases,	  which	   bear	   a	   special	   conventional	   (or	   baptismal)	   relation	   to	   their	   bearer	   (cf.	  Kripke	   1980).	   The	   special	   baptismal	   relation	   between	   proper	   names	   and	   their	  bearer	   accounts	   (somehow?)	   for	   their	   unique	   semantic	   properties.	   Capitalised	  descriptions,	  then,	  are	  syntactically	  complex	  proper	  names.	  	  That	   is	   fine	   as	   far	   as	   it	   goes.	   But	   capitalised	   descriptions,	   qua	   complex	  noun	  phrases,	  presumably	  have	  a	  complex	  internal	  compositional	  semantics,	  and	  the	  view	  outlined	   thus	   far	  has	   given	  us	  no	   clue	   as	   to	  how	   that	  works.	   It	   is	  not	  enough	   to	   simply	   distance	   the	   view	   from	   the	   naive	   view	   that	   capitalised	  descriptions	   fit	   the	   mould	   of	   ‘Theodore’.	   We	   need	   a	   story	   about	   how	   the	  semantics	  of	  ‘the	  Mississippi’	  relates	  to	  the	  semantics	  of	  ‘the	  mighty	  Mississippi’;	  and	   a	   story	   about	   how	   the	   semantics	   of	   ‘the	   Space	   Needle’	   relates	   to	   the	  semantics	   of	   ‘a	   Space	   Needle’.	   How	   is	   it	   that	   the	   semantic	   values	   of	   these	  expressions	   are	   compositionally	   determined	   by	   the	   semantic	   values	   of	   their	  syntactic	  constituents?	  	  Recall	   that	   the	   whole	   point	   of	   assimilating	   capitalised	   descriptions	   to	  proper	  names	  was	  to	  explain	  their	  apparent	  non-­‐descriptionality.	  The	  appeal	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  Coates’	   notion	   of	  	   ‘onymic’	   use	   versus	   ‘semantic’	   use	   is	   reminiscent	   of	   Donnellan’s	   (1966)	  referential/attributive	  distinction	  (see	  footnote	  9).	  But	  could	  an	  onymic	  use	  of	   ‘The	  First	  World	  War’	   refer	   to,	   say,	   the	   Second	  World	  War,	   if	   a	   speaker	   so	   intended?	  Presumably	  not.	   Likewise,	  theorists	  who	  think	  the	  referential-­‐attributive	  distinction	  is	  semantic	  maintain	  that	  the	  referent	  of	  a	  referential	  description	  must	  satisfy	  the	  restrictor	  (see,	  e.g.,	  Reimer	  1998).	  That	  is,	  when	  ‘The	  F’	  is	  referential	  it	  can	  refer	  to	  x	  only	  if	  x	  is	  F—but	  the	  descriptive	  content	  of	  ‘the	  F’	  is	  not	  part	  of	  the	  truth	  conditional	  content,	  only	  x	  is.	  Would	  Coates	  endorse	  such	  a	  constraint	  on	  onymic	  uses	  given	   that	   this	   effectively	   involves	   an	   ‘appeal	   to	   […]	   sense	   possessed	   by	   their	   constituents’?	  Presumably	  not.	  But	  then	  in	  virtue	  of	  what	  do	  onymic	  uses	  of	  	  ‘The	  First	  World	  War’	  only	  refer	  to	  the	  First	  World	  War?	  And	  in	  virtue	  of	  what	  do	  onymic	  uses	  of	  ‘the	  inventor	  of	  bifocals’	  only	  refer	  to	  Franklin?	  Thanks	  to	  Anders	  Schoubye	  for	  discussion	  here. 	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conventional	   associations	   between	   the	   name	   and	   its	   bearer	   or	   ‘baptisms’	  suggests	  the	  type	  of	  view	  where	  the	  semantic	  value	  of	  a	  name	  is	  simply	  its	  bearer	  (i.e.	  Millianism).	  If	  the	  semantic	  value	  of	  ‘the	  Mississippi	  River’	  is	  a	  certain	  river,	  then	   how	   is	   the	   semantic	   value	   of	   ‘the	   mighty	   Mississippi’	   compositionally	  determined	   by	   the	   semantic	   values	   of	   its	   syntactic	   constituents?	   It	   seems	   the	  only	  answer	  forthcoming	  is	  an	  undesirable	  appeal	  to	  ambiguity.	  While	  a	  view	  along	  the	   lines	  of	  Huddleston	  (1984)	  or	  Coates	  (2009)	  can	  classify	   capitalised	  descriptions	   as	   ‘proper	   names’	   and	   is	   equipped	   to	   confront	  the	  issues	  stemming	  from	  syntactic	  complexity,	  they	  are	  ill-­‐equipped	  to	  make	  a	  principled	   linguistic	  distinction	  between	  proper	  names	  and	  other	  definite	  noun	  phrases	   (e.g.	   ‘the	   Golden	   Gate	   Bridge’	   seems	   to	   behave	   semantically	   very	  differently	  than	  ‘the	  golden	  gate	  bridge’).	  A	  view	  that	  claims	  ‘the	  Space	  Needle’	  is	  a	   “name”	  with	   complex	   internal	   syntax,	   has	   the	   burden	  of	   explaining	  how	   it	   is	  that	   these	  noun	  phrases	  have	  distinctive	   semantic	   features—in	   fact,	   this	   is	   the	  same	  burden	  had	  by	  a	  view	  that	  says	  ‘the	  Space	  Needle’	  is	  not	  a	  name.	  Without	  such	   a	   story	   the	   view	   is	   no	   advance	   over	   the	   assimilation	   to	   definite	  descriptions—calling	  them	  ‘proper	  names’	  is	  a	  label	  for	  the	  linguistic	  work	  to	  be	  done	  not	  the	  work	  itself.	  But	   perhaps	   the	   work	   has	   already	   been	   done.	   Soames	   (2002)	   has	  explored	  some	  related	  issues	  that	  might	  be	  of	  help	  here.	  He	  introduces	  the	  idea	  of	   a	   ‘partially	   descriptive	   name’—these	   are	   names	   that	   are	   semantically	  equivalent	  to	  definite	  descriptions	  of	  a	  special	  sort.	  For	  example,	  Soames	  draws	  our	  attention	  to	  expressions	  like	  the	  following:	  ‘Professor	  Saul	  Kripke’,	  ‘Princess	  Diana’,	  ‘Miss	  Ruth	  Marcus’,	  ‘New	  York	  City’,	  ‘Mount	  Rainer’,	  and	  ‘Puget	  Sound’.	  On	  a	   first	   pass,	   it	   seems	   that	   whatever	   ‘Professor	   Kripke’	   refers	   to	   it	   must	   be	   a	  professor,	   and	  whatever	   ‘Puget	   Sound’	   refers	   to	   it	  must	  be	   a	   sound,	   etc.	  These	  cases	  support	   the	   idea	   that	  names	  can	  have	  a	  semantic	  value	  akin	   to	  a	  definite	  description,	  yet	  still	  be	  name-­‐like	  in	  important	  resects.	  	  What’s	   of	   interest	   for	   our	   purposes	   is	   that	   Soames	   also	   lists	   some	  capitalised	  descriptions	  in	  this	  connection,	  e.g.	  ‘the	  Columbia	  River’,	  ‘the	  Empire	  State	  Building’,	   ‘the	  Brooklyn	  Bridge’,	   ‘the	  Eiffel	  Tower’.	   Soames	   says	   these	  are	  also	  partially	  descriptive	  names,	  which	  he	  defines	  as	  follows.	  	  A	   partially	   descriptive	   name	   n	   is	   semantically	   associated	   with	   both	   a	  descriptive	  property	  PD	  and	  a	  referent	  o.	  The	  referent	  is	  o	  determined	  in	  part	   by	   having	   the	   property	  PD	   and	   in	   part	   by	   the	   same	   nondescriptive	  mechanisms	   that	   determine	   the	   reference	   of	   ordinary	   nondescriptive	  names—for	  instance,	  by	  a	  historical	  chain	  of	  transmission	  leading	  back	  to	  
o.	   The	   semantic	   content	   of	   n	   includes	   both	   o	   and	   D.	   The	   proposition	  expressed	   by	   a	   sentence	   ⎡n	   is	   F⎤	   is	   the	   same	   as	   that	   expressed	   by	   the	  sentence	   ⎡[the	   x:	   Dx	   	   &	   x=y]	   Fx⎤	   relative	   to	   an	   assignment	   of	   o	   to	   ‘y’.	  (Soames	  2002,	  p.	  110)	  	  For	   example,	   Soames	   says	   that	   ‘the	  Mississippi	   River’	   is	   a	   partially	   descriptive	  name,	   thus	   a	   sentence	   that	   it	   occurs	   in	   such	   as	   (19)	   will	   express	   the	   same	  proposition	   (have	   the	   same	   truth-­‐conditions)	   as	   sentence	   (20),	   relative	   to	   an	  assignment	  of	  the	  referent	  of	  ‘the	  Mississippi	  River’	  to	  ‘y’.	  	   (19)	  The	  Mississippi	  River	  is	  big.	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   (20)	  [the	  x:	  x	  =	  y	  &	  river(x)]	  big(x).	  	  Unfortunately,	  Soames	  provides	  no	  comment	  on	   the	  syntax	  of	   such	  phrases,	   so	  it’s	  not	   immediately	  clear	   that	   this	  view	  can	  accommodate	   the	  data	  concerning	  syntactic	  complexity.	  Yet	  it	  is	  compatible	  with	  the	  view—and	  seems	  reasonable	  given	   the	   semantic	   complexity—that	   ‘The	   Mississippi	   River’	   is	   syntactically	  complex.	  If	  so,	  then	  this	  view	  looks	  promising	  in	  that	  it	  provides	  a	  view	  on	  which	  capitalised	   descriptions	   are	   syntactically	   and	   semantically	   complex	   yet	   name-­‐like	  in	  they	  contribute	  a	  nondescriptional	  semantic	  element	  via	  a	  free	  variable.	  But	  on	  closer	   inspection	   this	  partially	  descriptive	  view	  provides	   little	  of	  the	  details	  we	  desire;	  and	  given	  the	  problems	  outlined	  below	   it	  seems	  unlikely	  that	  such	  details	  could	  be	   fleshed	  out	   in	  an	  adequate	  way.	  First	  notice	   that	   the	  analysis	  does	  not	  fare	  so	  well	  with	  some	  of	  our	  key	  examples:	  	  	  
• the  Holy  Roman  Empire 	  =	     the  𝑥:  𝑥 = 𝑦  &  empire(𝑥) 	  	  
• the  Space  Needle 	  =	     the  𝑥:  𝑥 = 𝑦  &  needle(𝑥) 	  	  
• the  Morning  Star 	  =	     the  𝑥:  𝑥 = 𝑦  &  star(𝑥) 	  	  
• the  Leaning  Tower  of  Pisa 	  =	     the  𝑥:  𝑥 = 𝑦  &  leaning(𝑥)  &  tower(𝑥) 	  	  
• the  Outback 	  =	     the  𝑥:  𝑥 = 𝑦  &       ? 	  	  
• the  Renaissance 	  =	     the  𝑥:  𝑥 = 𝑦  &       ? 	  	  	  There	   are	   things	   Soames	   could	   say	   about	   each	   case.	   	  One	  might	   insist	   that	   the	  Holy	   Roman	   Empire	   was	   indeed	   an	   empire	   contrary	   to	   Voltaire’s	   quote	   (see	  footnote	   4).	   With	   examples	   like	   ‘the	   Space	   Needle’	   one	   might	   insist	   that	   it	   is	  actually	  a	  reduced	  form	  of	  ‘the	  Space	  Needle	  Tower’,	  similar	  to	  the	  reduced	  form	  ‘the	  Mississippi’.	  This	  only	  goes	  so	  far,	  however,	  since	  it	  seems	  implausible	  that	  ‘the	  Morning	   Star’	   is	   a	   reduced	   form	   of	   ‘the	  Morning	   Star	   Planet’.	   And	   it’d	   be	  quite	   desperate	   to	   insist	   on	   expanded	   forms	   such	   as	   ‘the	  Renaissance	   Cultural	  Movement’	  and	  the	  ‘the	  Outback	  Area’.	  Of	  course,	  one	  could	  insist	  that	  examples	  like	  ‘the	  Renaissance’	  or	  ‘the	  Morning	  Star’	  are	  just	  normal	  proper	  names	  (i.e.	  not	  partially	  descriptive	  names)	  and	  so	  don’t	  get	  such	  an	  analysis.	  But	   then	  we	  are	  back	  to	  square	  one.	  Let’s	  set	  this	  type	  of	  problem	  aside	  and	  assume	  that	  one	  could	  deal	  with	  all	   such	   cases	   (perhaps	   the	   Space	   Needle	   and	   the	   Big	   Apple	   are	   needles	   and	  
apples,	   respectively,	   in	   some	   extended	   sense).	   More	   substantial	   problems	  remain,	   however.	   Presumably	   the	   analysis	   in	   terms	   of	   partially	   descriptive	  names	  could	  handle	   interposed	  adjectives.	   It	   seems	   that,	   following	   the	  analysis	  above,	  one	  could	  analyse	  ‘the	  mighty	  Mississippi	  River’	  as	  [the	  x:	  mighty(x)	  &	  x=y	  &	  river(x)].25	  But	  what	  about	  cases	  that	  involve	  other	  determiners	  (e.g.	  ‘a	  Space	  Needle’	  or	   ‘all	  Yellow	  Rivers’)?	   	  Here	  the	  theory	  of	  partially	  descriptive	  names	   just	   falls	  silent,	  since	  the	  expressions	  ‘a	  Space	  Needle’	  and	  ‘all	  Yellow	  Rivers’	  are	  not,	  I	  take	  it,	  partially	  descriptive	  names.	  But	  the	  problem	  is	  that	  there	  doesn’t	  seem	  to	  be	  a	  straightforward	  way	  to	  supplement	  the	  story	  to	  handle	  such	  cases	  in	  a	  uniform	  and	  principled	  manner.	  	  Or	  to	  put	  the	  worry	  in	  a	  simple	  minded	  way:	  It	  is	  not	  just	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  Would	  Soames	  also	  want	  to	  treat	  modified	  proper	  names	  as	  partial	  descriptive	  names,	  e.g.	  ‘the	  tall	  Alfred’	  or	  ‘the	  Alfred	  in	  my	  class’?	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a	  matter	  of	   switching	   the	  determiner	   from,	  e.g.	   ‘the	  x’	   to	   ‘∀x’	   to	  get	   [∀x:	  x=y	  &	  river(x)]	   (where	   ‘y’	   is	  assigned	  a	  certain	  river)—this	   is	  a	  decidedly	   implausible	  analysis	   of	   ‘all	   Yellow	  Rivers’.	   Admittedly,	   the	   view	   is	   not	   put	   forward	   to	   treat	  such	   cases,	   but	   given	   the	   close	   syntactic	   and	   semantic	   relationship	   between	  definite	   noun	   phrases	   and	   indefinite	   noun	   phrases,	   it	   is	   awkward,	   to	   say	   the	  least,	  that	  Soames	  provides	  a	  semantic	  analysis	  of	   ‘the	  Yellow	  River’,	  which	  has	  no	  discernible	  relation	  to	  the	  semantics	  of	  ‘a	  Yellow	  River’.	  This	   points	   to	   the	   key	   problem	  with	   Soames’	   proposal,	   in	   so	   far	   as	   it	   is	  construed	   as	   a	   theory	   of	   capitalised	  descriptions.	   It	   tells	   us	  what	   the	   semantic	  value	  of	  ‘the	  Mississippi	  River’	  is	  but	  it	  doesn’t	  tell	  us	  how	  the	  semantic	  value	  of	  ‘the	  Mississippi	  River’	  is	  determined	  by	  the	  semantic	  values	  of	  ‘the’,	  ‘Mississippi’,	  and	   ‘River’.	  The	  view	  only	   tells	  us	   the	   truth-­‐conditions	  of	   sentences	   containing	  capitalised	  descriptions.	  	  Notice	   how	   underdeveloped	   the	   semantic	   story	   is.	   It	   tells	   us	   that	   ‘the	  Mississippi	  River’	   is	  equivalent	  to	  a	  restricted	  definite	  description	  [the	  x:	  x=y	  &	  river(x)]	  with	  a	  free	  variable	  ‘y’	  that	  is	  assigned	  Old	  Man	  River	  by	  fiat;	  and	  it	  tells	  us	  that	   ‘the	  Columbia	  River’	   is	   likewise	  equivalent	  to	  [the	  x:	  x=y	  &	  river(x)]	  but	  with	   the	   free	   variable	   ‘y’	   assigned	   instead	   to	   what	   natives	   of	   the	   Pacific	  Northwest	  called	  ‘the	  big	  river’.	  Is	  this	  difference	  in	  the	  value	  of	  the	  free	  variable	  a	   product	   of	   the	   different	   semantic	   contributions	   made	   by	   ‘Mississippi’	   and	  ‘Columbia’?	   Soames	   says	   that	   the	   referent	   of	   a	   partially	   descriptive	   name	   is	  determined	   in	  part	  by	  having	  a	  certain	  descriptive	  property	  (e.g.	  being	  a	  river)	  and	   in	   part	   by	   a	   nondescriptional	   mechanism	   such	   as	   a	   historical	   chain	   of	  transmission	  (e.g.	  leading	  back	  to	  the	  baptism	  “We	  shall	  call	  thee	  Mississippi!”).	  But	  it	  is	  just	  not	  clear	  how	  this	  metasemantic	  claim	  can	  be	  translated	  into	  a	  story	  concerning	   the	   compositional	   semantics—especially	   a	   story	   that	   could	  accommodate	  both	  definite	  and	  indefinite	  determiners.	  Let’s	   in	   any	   case	   be	   overly	   charitable	   and	   imagine	   such	   a	   story	   were	  provided,	   i.e.	   a	   theory	   such	   that	   	   (i)	   ‘the	  Yellow	  River’	   is	   syntactically	   complex	  and	   its	   meaning	   is	   compositionally	   determined	   by	   the	   semantic	   values	   of	   its	  syntactic	   parts,	   (ii)	   in	   a	   way	   such	   that	   it	   is	   rigid	   (or	   nondescriptional	   in	   the	  relevant	  way),	  and	  (iii)	   the	  story	   is	  able	   to	  naturally	  accommodate	  expressions	  such	  as	   ‘the	   lower	  Yellow	  River’	  and	   ‘a	  Yellow	  River’	   in	  adequate	  way.	   In	  what	  sense	  would	  this	  be	  a	  vindication	  of	  the	  assimilation	  of	  capitalised	  descriptions	  to	  proper	  names?	  Here	  the	  debate	  threatens	  to	  become	  a	  mere	  terminological	  dispute.	  But	  I’d	   insist	   that	   historically	   speaking	   the	   terminology	   goes	   decidedly	   against	   the	  ‘names’	   view.	   	   The	   historical	   distinction	   between	   proper	   names	   and	   other	  denoting	   expressions	   has	   it	   that	   names	   are	   in	   some	   sense	   linguistically	   simple	  whereas	  definite	  descriptions	  are	  linguistically	  complex.26	  And	  we’ve	  seen	  ample	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  To	   bolster	   the	   historical	   claim	  we	   could	   look	   to	   Russell	   (1919),	   who	  makes	   the	   distinction	  between	   simple	   symbols	  which	   directly	   designate	   versus	   expressions	  which	   consist	   of	   several	  words	   whose	   meanings	   when	   combined	   result	   in	   the	   meaning	   of	   the	   complex	   expression.	   Or	  Church	  (1956)	  who	  makes	  the	  distinction	  between	  terms	  that	  are	  arbitrarily	  assigned	  a	  referent	  versus	  those	  that	  have	  a	  complex	  linguistic	  structure.	  Similar	  distinctions	  are	  found	  throughout	  much	  of	  twentieth	  century	  philosophy	  of	  language.	  (Interestingly,	  Kripke	  1980	  simply	  stipulates	  ‘We	  will	  use	  the	  term	  “name”	  so	  it	  does	  not	  include	  definite	  descriptions…	  but	  only	  those	  things	  that	  which	   in	  ordinary	   language	  would	  be	  called	   “proper	  names”’.	  This	   is	  of	   little	  help	  because	  capitalised	  descriptions	  are	  definite	  descriptions	  that	  are	  also	  ordinary	  called	  ‘proper	  names’.)	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evidence	  that	  capitalised	  descriptions	  fall	  into	  the	  latter	  category.	  Given	  this	  it’d	  be	   difficult	   to	   defend	   the	   idea	   that	   capitalised	   descriptions	   fall	   on	   the	   ‘proper	  names’	  side	  of	  the	  historical	  distinction.	  In	  general,	  any	  view	  that	  attempts	  to	  assimilate	  capitalised	  descriptions	  to	  proper	   names	   by	   expanding	   the	   class	   of	   proper	   names	   to	   include	   syntactically	  and	  semantically	  complex	  phrases,	  will	  have	   trouble	  drawing	  clear	  distinctions	  between	  proper	  names	  and	  definite	  descriptions.	   If	  one	   insists	   that	   there	   is	  no	  such	  distinction,	  I’m	  sympathetic,	  but	  I	  wouldn’t	  consider	  such	  a	  view	  a	  genuine	  assimilation	   of	   capitalised	   descriptions	   to	   proper	   names.	   	   In	   the	   absence	   of	   a	  clear	  theoretical	  distinction,	  calling	  capitalised	  descriptions	  	   ‘proper	  names’	  is	  a	  mere	  terminological	  victory.	  	  	  
3.	  Assimilation	  to	  Definite	  Descriptions	  
	  I	  think	  we	  should	  take	  the	  syntactic	  data	  at	  face-­‐value—capitalised	  descriptions	  are	  definite	  descriptions.	  This	  view,	  however,	  seemed	  to	  be	  a	  non-­‐starter	  due	  to	  the	   apparent	   semantic	  properties	   of	   capitalised	  descriptions,	   e.g.	   ‘The	  Morning	  Star	   is	   not	   a	   star’.	   How	   shall	   we	   proceed?	   We	   can	   gain	   some	   insight	   by	  considering	  the	  following	  sentence	  (inspired	  by	  Boër	  1975).	  	   (13)	  In	  a	  hotel,	  the	  thirteenth	  floor	  is	  considered	  unlucky.	  	  Is	   this	   sentence	   true	  or	   false?	  Assuming	   that	   ‘the	   thirteenth	   floor’	   refers	   to	   the	  floor	   that	   is	   thirteen	   floors	   above	   the	   ground,	   the	   sentence	   seems	   false.	   The	  thirteenth	   floor	   of	   a	   building	   is	   often	   called	   	   ‘14’	   (or	   ‘12B’	   or	   ‘M’)	   and	   is	   not	  thought	  to	  be	  unlucky—precisely	  because	  it	  is	  so-­‐called.	  But	  sentence	  (13)	  has	  a	  natural	  reading	  on	  which	  it	  seems	  true.	  On	  this	  reading,	  the	  definite	  description	  is	  understood	  to	  have	  ‘grown	  capitals’.	  	   (13*)	  In	  a	  hotel,	  the	  Thirteenth	  Floor	  is	  considered	  unlucky.	  	  The	   floor	   that	  bears	   the	  name	   ‘Thirteenth	  Floor’	   is	  considered	  unlucky,	  but	   the	  floor	  that	  is	  merely	  thirteen	  floors	  from	  the	  ground	  is	  not.	  Here	  it	  seems	  that	  in	  (13*)	   ‘Thirteenth	   Floor’	   is	   a	  metalinguistic	   predicate	   that	   expresses	   something	  like	   the	   property	   of	   bearing	   the	   label	   ‘Thirteenth	   Floor’—a	   property	   that	   is	  considered	  unlucky.	  Perhaps	   this	   is	   what	   we	   should	   say	   about	   capitalised	   descriptions	   in	  general:	   they	   are	   definite	   noun	   phrases	   syntactically	   constituted	   by	   nouns	   for	  metalinguistic	   kinds.	   The	   expression	   ‘the	   Holy	   Roman	   Empire’	   is	   a	   definite	  description	  that	  refers	  to	  the	  x	  such	  that	  x	  bears	  the	  name	  ‘Holy	  Roman	  Empire’.	  On	  this	  understanding	  the	  Holy	  Roman	  Empire	  needn’t	  be	  holy,	  Roman,	  nor	  an	  empire,	  but	  it	  must	  be	  a	  Holy	  Roman	  Empire—it	  must	  bear	  ‘Holy	  Roman	  Empire’.	  Compare	   this	   to	   the	   fact	   that	  a	  bearer	  of	   the	  name	   ‘Tiger	  Smith’	  need	  not	  be	  a	  tiger	  nor	  a	  smith	  but	  such	  a	  bearer	  will	  be	  a	  Tiger	  Smith.	  This	  proposal	  promises	  to	  explain	  the	  apparent	  semantic	  non-­‐descriptionality	  of	  capitalised	  descriptions,	  while	  accommodating	  the	  syntactic	  issues	  concerning	  interposed	  adjectives	  and	  other	  determiners.	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First	   consider	   syntactic	   complexity.	   On	   the	   current	   proposal	   capitalised	  descriptions	   are	   just	   definite	   descriptions,	   so	   there	   is	   no	   special	   syntactic	   or	  semantic	   problem	   for	   the	   interposing	   of	   various	  modifiers	   and	   adjectives	   into	  them—at	  least	  no	  problems	  beyond	  the	  standard	  issues	  concerning	  the	  internal	  compositional	  semantics	  of	  noun	  phrases.	  And	  given	  that,	  e.g.,	  ‘the	  Space	  Needle’	  is	   a	   definite	   description,	   it’s	   straightforward	   to	   analyse	   cases	   with	   other	  determiners,	   e.g.	   ‘a	   Space	  Needle’	   as	   an	   indefinite	  where	   to	   be	   a	   Space	  Needle	  something	  must	  be	  bearer	  of	  ‘Space	  Needle’.	  	  But	   the	   main	   problem	   was	   nondescriptionality.	   By	   appeal	   to	  metalingusitic	   predicates	   (e.g.	   ‘Golden	   Gate’)	   the	   proposal	   can	   make	   some	  advance	  over	  the	  analysis	  in	  terms	  of	  ordinary	  predicates	  (e.g.	  ‘golden	  gate’).	  The	  apparent	   semantic	   nondescriptionality	   of	   capitalised	   descriptions	   might	   be	  explained	  by	   appeal	   to	   homonymy	   (or	  what	   has	   been	   called	   ‘capitonymy’):	  we	  must	   distinguish	   the	   metalinguistic	   predicate	   ‘Morning	   Star’	   from	   the	  homonymous	   non-­‐metalinguistic	   predicate	   ‘morning	   star’.	   The	   Morning	   Star	  needn’t	  fall	  under	  the	  latter	  but	  it	  must	  fall	  under	  the	  former.	  But	  here	  too	  there	  are	  serious	  problems.	  Let’s	  discuss	  them	  in	  order	  of	  increasing	  seriousness.	  	  
Problem	  1.	   In	   an	   expression	   such	   as	   ‘the	  Mississippi	  River’	   does	   ‘river’	   express	  the	   property	   of	   being	   a	   large	   natural	   waterway	   or	   does	   it	   express	   the	  metalinguistic	  property	  of	  being	  a	  bearer	  of	  ‘River’?	  	  	  Carroll	  (1985)	  claims	  that,	  for	   example,	   the	  Willis	   Avenue	   Bridge	  must	   be	   a	  bridge,	   i.e.	   it	  must	   be	   a	   road	  structure	   that	   spans	   a	   physical	   obstacle—a	   data	   point	   Soames	   2002	   tries	   to	  accommodate	   with	   his	   analysis	   in	   terms	   of	   partially	   descriptive	   names.	   So,	   in	  such	  examples	   ‘Bridge’	  and	   ‘River’	  do	  not	  seem	  to	  express	  metalinguistic	  kinds.	  But	  in	  earlier	  examples	  we	  saw,	  e.g.,	  that	  the	  Morning	  Star	  is	  not	  a	  star,	  the	  Space	  Needle	  is	  not	  a	  needle,	  the	  Big	  Apple	  is	  not	  an	  apple,	  and	  the	  Holy	  Roman	  Empire	  was	  supposedly	  not	  an	  empire.	  	  	  One	   might	   think	   that	   what	   is	   going	   on	   here	   is	   the	   type	   of	   homonymy	  appealed	   to	  above.	   Sometimes	   the	   classifiers,	   such	  as	   ‘river’,	   ‘sea’,	   and	   ‘empire’	  are	  metalinguistic	  predicates	  but	  in	  many	  (most?)	  cases	  they	  are	  not.	  To	  keep	  the	  cases	  distinct	   it’d	  be	  appropriate	   to	   capitalise	  only	  when	   the	  noun	  expresses	   a	  metalinguistic	  kind,	  e.g.	  ‘the	  North	  star’	  versus	  ‘the	  Morning	  Star’,	  but,	  of	  course,	  we	  do	  not	   follow	  such	  a	   regimented	  practice.	   It	  may	  even	  be	   that	  we	  use	  both	  ‘the	   Mississippi	   River’	   and	   ‘the	   Mississippi	   river’	   where	   the	   former	   ‘river’	  expresses	   a	   property	   for	   a	   metalinguistic	   kind	   and	   the	   latter	   expresses	   a	  property	   for	   a	   waterway	   kind.	   If	   so,	   this	   would	   provide	   some	   headway	   on	   a	  puzzle	  presented	  in	  Cumming	  2009.	  	  The	  puzzle	   for	   the	  compositional	  analysis	  can	  be	  posed	  thus:	   the	  Yellow	  River	   (qua	   river-­‐name)	  must	  denote	   a	   river.	   Yet	   one	   can	   speak	  of	   there	  being	   two	   Yellow	   Rivers,	   one	   of	   them	   a	   waterway	   and	   the	   other	   a	  concerto.	  Where	  does	  the	  restriction	  to	  rivers	  come	  from	  in	  the	  first	  case,	  if	  absent	  from	  the	  second?	  (Cumming	  2009,	  p.	  23)	  	  It	   is	  plausible	   that	  here	   there	   is	  a	   slide	  between	   `the	  Yellow	  river',	  which	  must	  denote	  a	  river	  and	   `the	  Yellow	  River'	  which,	   in	   fact,	  denotes	   the	  same	  river	   (in	  the	  right	  context)	  and	  denotes	  a	  concerto	  (in	  a	  different	  context).	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Further	  evidence	  on	  the	  syntactic	  and	  semantic	  status	  of	  the	  classifiers	  is	  gained	   by	   considering	   cases	   involving	   coordination.	   The	   following	   sound	   fine,	  suggesting	   that	   both	   ‘bridges’	   and	   ‘empires’	   have	   their	   standard	   (non-­‐metalinguistic)	  meaning.	  	  	  	   (21)	  They’re	  doing	  construction	  on	  the	  Brooklyn	  and	  Manhattan	  Bridges.	  	   (22)	  The	  Holy	  Roman	  and	  British	  Empires	  hunted	  heretics.	  	  And	  consideration	  of	  cases	  involving	  pro-­‐forms	  provides	  more	  evidence.27	  	  	   (23)	  When	  the	  south	  bridge	  is	  blocked	  use	  the	  north	  one.	  	  	  	   (24)	  When	  the	  Brooklyn	  Bridge	  is	  blocked	  use	  the	  Manhattan	  one.	  	  One	  could	  use	  such	  tests	  to	  determine	  whether	  the	  classifier	  noun	  is	  part	  of	  the	  metalinguistic	  predicate	  or	  not.	  	  	  	   (25)	  #	  We	  saw	  the	  North	  Star	  before	  we	  saw	  the	  Morning	  one.	  	   (26)	  #	  The	  pianists	  played	  the	  Yellow	  River	  while	  crossing	  the	  Mississippi	  one.	  	  (27)	  #	  We	  were	  looking	  for	  a	  sewing	  needle	  but	  only	  found	  the	  Space	  one.	  	  To	  make	   good	   on	   the	   proposal	   the	  metalinguistic	   analysis	  must	   sort	   out	   these	  issues	  about	  the	  classifiers	  (e.g.	   ‘bridge’,	   ‘empire’,	   ‘star’,	  etc.).	  This	  has	  not	  been	  done	   in	  an	  adequate	  way	  here	  but	   it	   looks	   like	   there	  are	  promising	  avenues	   to	  pursue.	  	  
Problem	  2.	   	  Cumming	  (2009,	  p.	  22)	  states,	   ‘The	  Raritan	  River	   is	  not	  obviously	  a	  Raritan	   (nor	   is	   it	   quite	   correct	   to	   say	   that	   it	   is	   called	   Raritan—it	   is	   called	   the	  Raritan!)’.	  	  As	  an	  objection	  to	  the	  metalinguistic	  analyses	  this	  could	  be	  construed	  as	   the	   complaint	   that	   it	  has	  proposed	   the	  wrong	  metalinguistic	  property,	   since	  ‘the	   Space	   Needle’	   refers	   to	   the	   thing	   called	   ‘the	   Space	   Needle’,	   not	   the	   thing	  called	  ‘Space	  Needle’.	  Here	   I	   think	   the	   metalinguistic	   view	   has	   an	   adequate	   response.	   The	  response	   draws	   on	   an	   old	   distinction	   between	   bearing	   a	   name	   versus	   being	  referred	   to	   by	   a	   name	  made	   by	   Bach	   (1987)	   (see	   also	   Bach	   1981),	   which	   has	  recently	   been	   given	   new	   life	   in	   terms	   of	   an	   analysis	   of	   appellative-­‐‘called’	  constructions	  (see	  Fara	  2011	  and	  Matushansky	  2005).	  Here’s	  how	  Fara	  puts	  it:	  	  To	  be	  called	  Willard	  is	  to	  have	  ‘Willard’	  as	  a	  name.	  To	  be	  called	  ‘Willard’	  is	  for	  someone	  to	  address	  you	  or	  refer	  to	  you	  using	  that	  name.	  That	  is	  how	  the	   appellative-­‐‘called’	   construction	   works…	   You	   can	   be	   called	   Willard	  without	   being	   called	   ‘Willard’,	   and	   you	   can	   be	   called	   ‘Willard’	   without	  being	  called	  Willard;	  you	  can	  have	  names	  that	  no	  one	  ever	  addresses	  you	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  Thanks	  again	  to	  James	  Shaw	  for	  discussion	  here.	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by,	  and	  you	  can	  be	  addressed	  by	  names	  other	  than	  your	  own.	  (Fara	  2011,	  p.	  493)	  	  The	  metalinguistic	   analysis	  of	   capitalised	  descriptions	   should	   respond	   in	  a	   like	  manner:	  It’s	  true	  that	  the	  Space	  Needle	  isn’t	  called	  ‘Space	  Needle’	  but	  it	  is	  called	  Space	  Needle—it	  is	  a	  bearer	  of	  ‘Space	  Needle’—and	  the	  latter	  is	  all	  that	  has	  been	  claimed.	  	  Or	  in	  Bach’s	  terminology	  we	  could	  say	  that	  the	  Space	  Needle	  bears	  the	  name	  ‘Space	  Needle’	  but	  it	  isn’t	  referred	  to	  by	  ‘Space	  Needle’.	   	  Notice	  that	  there	  isn’t	   a	   The	   Space	   Needle	   in	   Seattle	   and	   nothing	   in	   Seattle	   bears	   ‘The	   Space	  Needle’;	  but	  there	  is	  a	  Space	  Needle	  in	  Seattle,	  which	  bears	  ‘Space	  Needle’.28	  	  
Problem	  3.	  Given	  a	  capitalised	  description	  ‘the	  Space	  Needle’	  or	  ‘the	  Holy	  Roman	  Empire’	   is	   the	   meaning	   of	   the	   capitalised	   nominal-­‐-­‐-­‐let’s	   call	   these	   ‘proper	  nominals’—compositionally	   determined?	   	   Matushansky	   (2008)	   provides	   a	  metalinguistic	   analysis	   of	   proper	   names	   whereby	   complex	   names	   such	   as	  ‘Sherlock	   Holmes’	   have	   a	   compositional	   internal	   semantics.	   She	   provides	   an	  intersective	  semantics	   for	   ‘Sherlock	  Holmes’	  such	   that	   to	  be	  a	  Sherlock	  Holmes	  one	   must	   be	   both	   a	   Sherlock	   and	   a	   Holmes.	   But	   some	   cases	   are	   more	  complicated,	   since	   e.g.	   it’s	   true	   that	   the	   Rolling	   Stones	   are	   Stones,	   they	   aren’t	  
Rolling	  in	  any	  literal	  sense;	  and,	  likewise,	  the	  Space	  Needle	  is	  neither	  a	  Space	  nor	  a	  Needle	  (in	  a	  literal	  sense).	  Or	  to	  make	  the	  objection	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  distinction	  above:	  the	  Golden	  Gate	  Bridge	  is	  called	  Golden	  Gate,	  but	  its	  not	  called	  Golden	  nor	  is	   it	   called	   Gate—it	   bears	   ‘Golden	   Gate’.	   	   To	   this	   problem	   Cumming	   (2009)	  suggest	  what	  I	  take	  to	  be	  the	  proper	  route.	  	   It	  might	   be	   preferable,	   then,	   to	   treat	   the	   proper	   nominal	   as	   a	   semantic	  atom	   (with	   a	   metalinguistic	   interpretation),	   rather	   than	   attempting	   to	  distribute	   its	   meaning	   among	   is	   syntactic	   daughters.	   For	   instance,	   any	  object	  with	  the	  name	  	  George	  Washington	  Bridge	  would	  count	  as	  a	  George	  Washington	  Bridge.	  A	  Golden	  Gate	  Bridge	  would	  be	  something	  having	  the	  title	  Golden	  Gate	  Bridge.	  (Cumming	  2009,	  p.	  22)	  	  This	  is	  progress,	  except	  I	  would	  amend	  the	  suggestion	  slightly.	  It	  seems	  that	  the	  relevant	  atom	  involved	  is	  ‘Golden	  Gate’,	  not	  ‘Golden	  Gate	  Bridge’,	  since	  as	  we’ve	  seen	  in	  such	  a	  phrase	  ‘bridge’	  is	  semantically	  active	  and	  syntactically	  separable.	  	  
Problem	   4.	   	   The	   metalinguistic	   analysis	   has	   an	   explanation	   for	   why	   ‘the	   Holy	  Roman	   Empire’	   seems	   semantically	   nondescriptional	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   its	  referent	   needn’t	   be	   holy.	   	   But	   even	   on	   the	   metalinguistic	   analysis	   capitalised	  description	  are	   still	   descriptive	   in	   some	   sense—they	  describe	   their	   referent	   as	  being	   the	   unique	   thing	   that	   bears	   a	   certain	   name.	   The	  worry	   is	   that	   there	   are	  cases	   that	   call	   for	   a	   more	   strict	   form	   of	   semantic	   nondescriptionality,	   i.e.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  Note	  that	  when	  a	  title	  begins	  with	  an	  article	  (e.g.	  ‘The	  Office’)	  it	  is	  natural,	  at	  least	  in	  speech,	  to	  drop	  an	  article	  when	  using	  the	  proper	  title	  would	  give	  you	  two	  articles	  in	  a	  row.	  But,	  as	  Ian	  Nance	  has	   reminded	  me,	   leaving	   the	   article	   in	   is	   acceptable.	   For	   example,	   ‘the	   The	   Office	   episode’	   is	  passable	  (although	  a	  bit	  weird),	  whereas	  ‘the	  The	  Space	  Needle	  elevator’	  can	  only	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  stutter.	  Or	  consider	  this:	  Q:	  ‘Who	  is	  Apu?’,	  A:	  ‘He’s	  a	  The	  Simpsons	  character’.	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capitalised	   descriptions	   seem	   to	   be	   genuinely	   rigid,	   whereas	   definite	  descriptions	  are	  not.	  The	   philosophical	   lore	   on	   definite	   descriptions	   and	   names	   has	   it	   that	  generally	   speaking	   definite	   descriptions	   allow	   for	   de	   re/de	   dicto	   ambiguities	  (also	  know	  as	  	  ‘scope	  ambiguities’).	  For	  example,	  a	  sentence	  such	  as	  	  	  (28)	  The	  president	  might	  have	  been	  a	  Republican.	  	  allows	  for	  both	  the	  de	  dicto	  reading	  (a)	  and	  the	  de	  re	  reading	  (b):	  	   (a)	  Might(Republican(the	  president))	  	  	   (b)	  λx[Might(Republican(x))](the	  president)	  	  Whereas	  names,	  the	  lore	  continues,	  do	  not	  in	  general,	  allow	  for	  such	  ambiguities.	  For	  consider,	  	   (29)	  Obama	  might	  have	  been	  a	  Republican.	  	  Whether	   or	   not	   ‘Obama’	   is	   given	   syntactic	   scope	   over	   the	   modal,	   the	   truth	  conditions	  are	  the	  same—that	  is	  we	  can’t	  hear	  a	  de	  re/de	  dicto	  ambiguity	  as	  we	  can	  with	  (28).	  	   (a)	  Might(Republican(Obama))	  	  	   (b)	  λx[Might(Republican(x))](Obama)	  	  Thus,	  it	  seems	  that	  definite	  descriptions	  are	  generally	  nonrigid,	  in	  that	  they	  allow	  for	  narrow	  scope	   readings	   such	  as	   (28a),	  whereas	  proper	  names	  are	   generally	  rigid,	  in	  the	  they	  don’t	  allow	  for	  such	  narrow	  scope	  readings	  (Kripke	  1980).	  But	  what	  about	  capitalised	  descriptions?	  	   (30)	  Flight	  175	  could	  have	  crashed	  into	  the	  Space	  Needle.	  	  It	  is	  very	  difficult	  to	  get	  the	  narrow	  scope	  reading	  of	  (30),	  where	  it	  is	  true	  just	  in	  case	   the	   following	  scenario	   is	  possible:	   	  Flight	  175	  doesn’t	   crash	   into	  a	   famous	  tower	   in	   Seattle	   but	   it	   does	   crash	   into	   the	   unique	   tower	   that	   bears	   the	   name	  ‘Space	   Needle’.	   But	   if	   ‘the	   Space	   Needle’	   is	   analysed	   as	   a	   definite	   description	  equivalent	  to	   ‘the	  bearer	  of	  “Space	  Needle”’,	   the	  reading	  (according	  to	  the	   lore)	  should	  be	  available.	  If	  we	  substitute	  ‘the	  bearer	  of	  “Space	  Needle”’	  for	  ‘the	  Space	  Needle’	  is	  the	  narrow	  scope	  reading	  available?	  	   (31)	  Flight	  175	  could	  have	  crashed	  into	  the	  bearer	  of	  ‘Space	  Needle’.	  	  Perhaps	   it	   is	   easier	   to	   get	   the	   narrow	   scope	   reading	   here,	   but	   to	  my	   ear	   it	   is	  definitely	  not	  as	  clear	  of	  a	  case	  as,	  e.g.	  (28).	  Likewise	  consider	  the	  following	  pair:	  	   (32a)	  Caesar	  might	  not	  have	  crossed	  the	  Rubicon.	  	  (32b)	  Caesar	  might	  not	  have	  crossed	  the	  river	  named	  ‘Rubicon’.	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It	  is	  difficult	  to	  get	  the	  de	  dicto	  readings	  where	  what	  is	  claimed	  to	  be	  possible	  is	  that	   some	   other	   river	   was	   the	   unique	   bearer	   of	   ‘Rubicon’	   and	   Caesar	   did	   not	  cross	   it,	   although	  perhaps	  he	  did	   cross	   the	   shallow	   river	   in	  northeastern	   Italy.	  Again,	  it	  is	  perhaps	  easier	  to	  get	  the	  relevant	  reading	  with	  (32b).	  A	   more	   difficult	   case	   for	   the	   metalinguistic	   analysis	   might	   be	   the	  following:	  	  (33)	   The	   Holy	   Roman	   Empire	   might	   not	   have	   been	   the	   Holy	   Roman	  Empire.	  	  (34)	   The	   Holy	   Roman	   Empire	  might	   not	   have	   been	   the	   bearer	   of	   ‘Holy	  Roman	  Empire’.	  	  It	  is	  more	  difficult	  to	  get	  a	  true	  reading	  of	  (33)	  than	  it	  is	  to	  get	  a	  true	  reading	  of	  (34)—though	   (34)	   is	   not	   completely	   natural.29	  But	   the	   metalinguistic	   analysis	  should	  have	  these	  coming	  out	  the	  same.30	  How	  can	  the	  advocate	  of	  the	  metalinguistic	  view	  of	  capitalised	  description	  respond?	  There	   is	  by	  now	  a	  vast	   literature	  on	   these	   types	  of	  problems	  as	   they	  arise	  for	  any	  view	  that	  claims	  that	  names	  are	  semantically	  equivalent	  to	  definite	  descriptions	  (see,	  e.g,	  Soames	  2002,	  pp.	  18-­‐54).	  A	  certain	  subset	  of	  this	  literature	  is	  especially	  relevant	  for	  the	  current	  problem,	  namely	  the	  set	  of	  papers	  that	  deal	  with	  scopal	  problems	  as	  they	  arise	  for	  the	  metalinguistic	  analysis	  of	  names	  (see	  Bach	  2002,	  Matushansky	  2008,	  Rothschild	  2007,	  and	  Fara	  2015a).	  	  	  	  The	  metalinguistic	  analysis	  of	  names	  is	  motivated	  by	  the	  observation	  that	  proper	   names	   can	   occur	   in	   syntactic	   predicate	   position	   (see	   Sloat	   1969	   and	  	  Burge	  1973).	  Consider	  the	  following	  sentences	  with	  names	  in	  predicate	  position.	  	  (35)	  The	  controversial	  Noam	  Chomsky	  delivered	  a	  lecture.	  	  (36)	  An	  Alfred	  joined	  the	  club	  today.	  (Burge	  1973)	  	  Such	  examples	  suggest	  that	  the	  expressions	  that	  are	  traditionally	  called	  ‘proper	  names’	  are,	  in	  fact,	  predicates	  for	  metalingusitic	  kinds.	  This	  view,	  in	  one	  form	  or	  another,	  has	  a	  reputable	  history	  of	  advocates,	  e.g.	  	  	  Kneale	  (1966),	  Sloat	  (1969),	  Burge	  (1973),	  Longobardi	  (1994),	  Geurts	  (1997),	  Bach	  (2002),	  Elugardo	  (2002),	  and	   has	   most	   recently	   been	   defended	   by	   Matushansky	   (2008),	   Izumi	   (2012),	  Fara	   (2015a),	   and	   Fara	   (2015b).	   The	   phenomena	   of	   descriptions	   with	   grown	  
capitals	   and	  names	  in	  predicate	  position	   cohere	  very	  naturally	  and,	   in	   fact,	  both	  point	  to	  troubles	  with	  the	  old	  dogma	  that	  names	  are	  the	  analogs	  of	  constants	  in	  first-­‐order	  logic.	  But	   both	   the	   predicate	   view	   of	   names	   and	   the	   analysis	   of	   capitalised	  descriptions	   as	   metalinguistic	   descriptions	   face	   the	   modal	   scope	   problems	  outlined	   above.	   It	   is	   alleged	   that	   the	   metalinguistic	   account	   of	   names	   cannot	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  Provided	   the	   right	   context	   perhaps	   a	   true	   reading	   of	   (34)	   is	   available.	   Consider:	   Had	   it	   not	  been	   for	   the	   addition	   of	   the	   term	   ‘Holy’	   in	   certain	   12th	   century	   documents,	   the	   Holy	   Roman	  Empire	   might	   not	   have	   been	   the	   Holy	   Roman	   Empire	   at	   all.	   The	   availability	   of	   this	   reading,	  however,	  seems	  to	  rely	  on	  a	  subtle	  change	   in	   intonation.	  A	  referee	  suggests	  a	  comparison	  with	  ‘Had	  Samuel	  Clemens	  died	  in	  the	  Civil	  War,	  there	  would	  have	  been	  no	  Mark	  Twain’.	  	  30	  Thanks	  to	  both	  Dilip	  Ninan	  and	  Ian	  Nance	  for	  discussion	  of	  this	  type	  of	  objection.	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accommodate	   the	  data	  concerning	  modal	  embedding	   in	  a	  principled	  manner.	   If	  so,	   such	  an	  analysis	   should	  be	   rejected,	   and	   thus	   the	  metalinguistic	   analysis	  of	  capitalised	  descriptions	  should	  likewise	  be	  rejected.	  But	  if	  one	  of	  the	  predicative	  views	  on	  names	  can	  successfully	  accommodate	  (or	  explain	  away)	  the	  embedding	  data,	   then	   it	   seems	   that	   the	  metalinguistic	   analysis	   of	   capitalised	   descriptions	  could	  appeal	  to	  the	  same	  account.	  In	  other	  words,	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  the	  objection	  from	  modal	  embedding,	  the	  theses	  stand	  and	  fall	  together.	  	  Does	  the	  predicate	  view	  of	  names	  have	  a	  satisfying	  account	  of	  the	  modal	  embedding	   data?	   Is	   it	   that	   ‘the	   Alfred’	   is	   an	   incomplete	   description,	   or	   is	   it	   a	  ‘particularised’	  description,	  or	  is	  that	  it	  contains	  a	  covert	  indexical,	  or	  what?	  	  We	  cannot	  not	  hope	  to	  settle	  this	  issue	  here.31	  	  Nevertheless,	   even	   without	   settling	   that	   complicated	   issue,	   I	   think	   we	  have	  an	  interesting	  result:	  the	  most	  promising	  analysis	  of	  capitalised	  descriptions	  
confronts	   exactly	   the	   same	   hurdle	   as	   the	   predicate	   view	   of	   names.	   Capitalised	  descriptions	   are,	   syntactically	   speaking,	   definite	   descriptions,	   which	   also	  systematically	   disallow	   narrow	   scope	   readings	   under	   modals.	   That	   is,	   a	   large	  class	  of	  noun	  phrases	  with	  internal	  syntactic	  complexity	  fronted	  by	  the	  definite	  article	  are	  also	  systematically	  rigid.	  Whatever	  theory	  explains	  this	  data	  could	  be	  employed	   in	   a	   defence	   of	   the	   view	   that	   names	   in	   argument	   position	   are	  predicates	  with	  covert	  or	  denuded	  determiners	  (in	  line	  with	  the	  accounts	  in,	  e.g.,	  Matushansky	   2008,	   Izumi	   2012,	   or	   Fara	   2015a32).	   Without	   such	   a	   theory,	  however,	  the	  metalinguistic	  analysis	  of	  capitalised	  descriptions	  is	  incomplete.	  	  Capitalised	   descriptions	   remain	   an	   anomaly—not	   quite	   names,	   yet	   not	  
quite	  descriptions.	  	  	  
4.	  Conclusion	  
	  We’ve	  seen	  that	  syntactically,	  capitalised	  descriptions	  behave	  like	  definite	  noun	  phrases,	  and	  thus	  are	  not	  syntactically	  simple	  as	  the	  assimilation	  to	  names	  would	  seem	  to	  require.	  But	  semantically,	  capitalised	  descriptions	  behave	   in	  a	  peculiar	  manner	   for	   a	   definite	   description:	   they	   seem	   metalinguistic,	   their	   internal	  semantics	   is	   not	   straightforward,	   and	   most	   importantly	   they	   act	   like	   proper	  names	   in	   that	   they	   are	   rigid.	   Given	   this,	   capitalised	   descriptions	   are	   not	  semantically	   descriptive	   in	   the	   way	   we’d	   expect.	   A	   metalinguistic	   analysis	   is	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  Though	   a	   response	   that	   is	   particularly	   promising	   is	   one	   based	   on	   the	   account	   provided	   in	  Rothschild	  2007.	  As	   applied	   to	   the	  metalinguistic	   analysis	   of	   capitalised	  descriptions	  we	   could	  speculate	  that	  there	  is	  something	  about	  capitalised	  descriptions	  such	  that	  they	  tend	  to	  be	  used	  as	  
particularised	  descriptions	   instead	   of	   role-­‐type	  descriptions.	   Support	   for	   this	   is	   found	   by	   noting	  that	  it	   is	  difficult	  to	  cook	  up	  natural	  scenarios	  where	  metalinguistic	  descriptions	  are	  role-­‐like—such	  situations	  have	  to	  be	  quite	  unique.	  32 	  Capitalised	   descriptions	   present	   an	   apparent	   counterexample	   to	   Fara’s	   (2015a,	   p.	   109)	  syntactic	  generalisation	  that	  the	  (unstressed)	  definite	  article	  must	  be	  realised	  as	  Øthe	  when	  it	  has	  a	  “name”	  as	   its	  sister.	  Doesn’t	   the	  definite	  article	   in	   ‘the	  Space	  Needle’	  have	  a	  proper	  noun	  as	  a	  sister?	   It	  seems	  that	   in	   this	  case	   the	  definite	  article	   is	   indeed	  realised	  as	  unstressed,	  overt,	  and	  with	  a	  name	  as	  its	  sister.	  But	  of	  course	  this	  prompts	  the	  prior	  question:	  what	  notion	  of	  a	  “name”	  is	  operative	  in	  Fara’s	  syntactic	  generalisation?	  What	  notion	  of	  a	  “name”	  has	  it	  that	  the	  capitalised	  noun	  ‘Space	  Needle’	  in	  ‘the	  Space	  Needle’	  is	  not	  a	  “name”,	  while	  'Eva'	  in	  ‘the	  ever-­‐popular	  Eva’	  is	  a	  “name”.	  Cases	  such	  as	   ‘the	  Space	  Needle’	  (or	   'a	  Space	  Needle’	   for	  that	  matter)	   just	  seem	  to	  be	  more	   cases	   where	   names	   occur	   in	   predicate	   position—so	   in	   line	   with	   The-­‐Predicativism	   but	  nevertheless	  at	  odds	  with	  Fara’s	  “Where	  Øthe”	  rule.	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initially	  promising	  but	  it	  only	  takes	  us	  so	  far,	  and	  runs	  headlong	  into	  the	  issues	  that	  plague	  the	  metalinguistic	  views	  of	  names.	  	  Given	  this	  what	  should	  we	  ultimately	  say	  about	  capitalised	  descriptions?	  Are	   they	   names	   or	   definite	   descriptions?	   This	   prompts	   a	   prior	   question:	  What	  does	  it	  even	  mean	  to	  say	  the	  capitalised	  descriptions	  are	  ‘names’?	  One	  common	  way	  to	  distinguish	  proper	  names	  from	  other	  noun	  phrases	  is	  to	  say	  that	  proper	  names	  are	  singular	  terms	  that	  lack	  syntactic	  structure.	  If	  so,	  then	  for	  the	  reasons	  provided	  in	  this	  paper	  capitalised	  descriptions	  are	  decidedly	  not	  proper	  names.	  But	  I	  suspect	  that	  for	  many	  theorists	  the	  linguistic	  category	  ‘proper	  name’	  is	  not	  a	  syntactic	  or	  grammatical	  category	  per	  se.	  It	  is	  instead	  a	  quasi-­‐semantic	  category	  that	   picks	   up	   on	   features	   like	   arbitrary	   assignment	   of	   referent,	   rigidity,	   and	  semantic	   simplicity	   (see,	   e.g.,	   Soames	   2002,	   p.	   53).	   If	   this	   is	   the	   criterion	   then	  perhaps	  capitalised	  descriptions	  could	  count	  as	  ‘names’	  in	  that	  sense—although	  their	  syntactic	  complexity	  suggests	  some	  corresponding	  semantic	  complexity.	  In	  either	  case,	   it	  seems	  that	  the	  traditional	  distinction	  between	  proper	  names	  and	  definite	   descriptions	   is	   under	   threat.	   Do	   some	   proper	   names	   begin	   with	   a	  semantically	   active	   definite	   article?	   Do	   some	   proper	   names	   have	   a	   complex	  internal	   semantics?	   Are	   some	   rigid	   definite	   descriptions	   proper	   names?	   Are	  some	  syntactically	  complex	  definite	  descriptions	  nevertheless	  ‘tags’?	  At	   this	   point	   one	   might	   demur	   on	   the	   grounds	   that	   according	   to	   the	  traditional	   taxonomy,	   there	   is	   an	   important	   linguistic	   distinction	   between	  ‘proper	   names’	   and	   ‘definite	   descriptions’;	   or	   between	   proper	   nouns	   and	  common	   nouns.	   But	   the	   analysis	   of	   capitalised	   descriptions	   suggests	   that	   this	  distinction	  is	  a	  philosophical	  myth	  that	  does	  not	  hold	  to	  sustained	  scrutiny.	  One	  might	   conclude	   therefore,	   that	   this	   traditional	   taxonomy	  must	   be	   rejected.	  But	  whether	   or	   not	   we	   draw	   such	   a	   grand	   conclusion	   (along	   the	   lines	   of	   Coates	  2006),	   we	   still	   have	   not	   ultimately	   solved	   the	   puzzle	   concerning	   descriptions	  which	  have	  grown	  capital	  letters.	  	  What	   should	   we	   say	   about	   this	   ubiquitous	   yet	   hitherto	   theoretically	  neglected	   form	   of	   expression,	   which	   is	   syntactically	   on	   a	   par	   with	   definite	  descriptions	   yet	   at	   the	   same	   time	   semantically	   on	   a	   par	   with	   names?	   What	  explains	  the	  fact	  that	  a	  certain	  subclass	  of	  definite	  descriptions,	  namely	  the	  ones	  that	   have	   grown	   capital	   letters,	   systematically	   disallow	  narrow	   scope	   readings	  under	   modals?	   An	   answer	   to	   this	   puzzle	   may	   shed	   light	   on	   the	   semantic	   and	  syntactic	  properties	  of	  their	  lower-­‐case	  and	  ‘the’-­‐less	  cousins.	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